

American Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy

*American foreign aid to Afghanistan in relation to
American foreign policy, foreign policy traditions,
and American interests*

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Abstract

The presented Masters Thesis seeks to develop a better understanding of the relationship between American foreign aid, American foreign policy traditions, American foreign policy towards Afghanistan for the years 2007-2012, and American interests. It does so by answering the following questions: Theories on development typologies reveal that there are several ways to build a failed state, but what particular type of state building does the U.S. government do, and what is their reasoning for doing it? And is this consistent with its foreign policy? How does this relate to American foreign policy traditions and American interests? In order to do this I define American foreign policy traditions and American self-interest, as well as accounting for three different development typologies: State-building, nation-building, and society-building. To connect these aspects of American foreign relations to a specific case, I analyse the American aid efforts in Afghanistan for the years 2007-2012, using American reports to OECD, accounting for Official Development Assistance (ODA). The data is divided according to the three typologies in order to discuss the American strategy when donating aid and forming foreign policy goals. The analysis and discussion of the thesis exposes that American aid work in Afghanistan at some points is consistent with American foreign policy goals in Afghanistan, but also that there are conflicting elements between foreign policy goals and the aid effort during the years researched. The American foreign policy goals in Afghanistan also contain elements of at least two American foreign policy traditions, exposing a difference between the foreign relation strategy of the Truman Doctrine and the Bush Doctrine. American interests are present in all foreign policy goals and the aid effort in Afghanistan, but somewhat surprisingly, they are not rooted in economic interests; stability and safety for American citizens are the predominant American interests being represented when the U.S. government contributed with foreign aid in Afghanistan.

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Introduction

Foreign policy and foreign aid are intertwined aspects of foreign relations that can reveal much on the foreign profile of a state. The American foreign policy oscillates between isolationism and heavy intrusion on foreign land, often leading to a long-term aid effort. American interests are at the core of American foreign policy and is the factor that shapes the foreign policy of the United States. Foreign aid is also related to foreign policy and it is interesting to analyse that relationship because for American foreign relations there seems to be little difference between the two. This is especially true in the case of the post 9/11-efforts in Afghanistan, as the policy to go to war against terrorism has resulted in a long-term aid effort, which now is closely connected to new foreign policy towards Afghanistan. Theories on development typologies reveal that there are several ways to build a failed state, but what particular type of state building does the U.S. government do, and what is their reasoning for doing it? And is this consistent with its foreign policy? How does this relate to American foreign policy traditions and American interests? These are questions that will be answered in this thesis after giving thorough consideration of American foreign policy, types of aid, development theory, and quantitative analysis.

The thesis consists of three chapters, whereby the first is an introduction to methodology, theoretical framework, and important definitions. This is partly done by literature review to establish what American foreign policy traditions are, but also analysis of academic literature on several subjects, such as self-interest and foreign aid, in order to construct definitions that are relevant and applicable for this thesis. The second chapter consists of a quantitative analysis of American foreign aid to Afghanistan for the years 2007-2012, analysing the data in relation to different variables in order to give a critical view on the aid efforts. The reason for doing this is to be able to discuss a specific use of aid, whereby Afghanistan is an interesting case because it is a failed state, meaning that there are many areas that needs development, creating data that are both diverse and large in size. The third chapter contains the main discussion, which is a discussion on the connection between the foreign aid analysed in the second chapter, and foreign aid traditions, foreign policy towards Afghanistan, and American self-interest. These are all aspects that can explain foreign aid priorities and therefore I find it interesting to discuss the mentioned aspects in order to be able to discuss American interests in Afghanistan in relation to both the specific foreign policy towards Afghanistan, as well as foreign policy traditions. To enable such a discussion it is necessary to have specific and reliable data that can indicate the actual U.S. priority in

states such as Afghanistan, which is the explanation for why the thorough analysis in the second chapter is so important.

1 Definitions, theories, and foreign relations discussions

1.1 The War in Afghanistan

The U.S. military operations in Afghanistan were a direct consequence of the 9/11-attacks. President George W. Bush responded to the attacks in a speech on September 12, 2001 by calling the attacks “acts of war” and that the U.S. would “... use all [their] resources to conquer this enemy.”¹ Exactly one week after the attacks, the 107th Congress wrote and approved of Public Law 107-40, which was a joint resolution with the intention to “... authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States.”² This gave the President the possibility of using military force against nations that may have had any connection to the attacks, and/or harbouring persons or organisations connected to the attacks.³ There was awareness of Al-Qaeda being present in Afghanistan, being harboured by the Taliban government. Because there was no will from the Afghan government to exchange any of the Al-Qaeda members, this ended in the first American attacks in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001.⁴

After almost two years, during which the U.S.-led forces had fought Al-Qaeda, NATO contributed with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The ISAF operations began on August 11, 2003: “Mandated by the United Nations, ISAF’s primary objective was to enable the Afghan government to provide effective security across the country and develop new Afghan security forces to ensure Afghanistan would never again become a safe haven for terrorists.”⁵ This meant that several other NATO nations contributed with security enforcement in Afghanistan, making the efforts an international matter instead of an American-led operation with just a few allies.

¹ George W. Bush, "President Bush," *PBS*, September 12, 2001.

² *Joint Resolution - to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces against Those Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched against the United States*, 107th, Public Law 107-40.

³ *Joint Resolution - to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces against Those Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched against the United States*.

⁴ Ian Christopher McCaleb, "Defense Officials: Air Operation to Last 'Several Days'," *CNN*, October 7, 2001.

⁵ "Isaf's Mission in Afghanistan (2001-2014)," NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69366.htm.

In 2009, after becoming president, Barack Obama approved an increase of American troops in Afghanistan.⁶ Stated by Obama, “this increase is necessary to stabilize a deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, which has not received the strategic attention, direction and resources it urgently requires.”⁷ It was understood that this was temporary and two years later Obama could declare that the extraction of American soldiers would start.⁸ December 28, 2014 the U.S. and NATO formally ended the war in Afghanistan, leaving about 13 500 soldiers, which from January 1, 2015 transitioned into a supporting role.⁹

1.2 Defining foreign aid

For this thesis the overall definition of foreign aid is based on the definition that OECD uses for Official Development Assistance (ODA):

Official development assistance is defined as those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients (available at www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist) and to multilateral development institutions which are:

- i. provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and
- ii. each transaction of which:
 - a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and
 - b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent)¹⁰

The data material that is available for U.S. aid given to Afghanistan that fulfils this definition does not only consist of aid being given directly from USAID, but also from other U.S. agencies or departments. USAID has been given the task to make the reports that are submitted to the OECD/DAC, so there is a need to underline that the aid that will be analysed does not only come from USAID, but also other official U.S. government branches. As this thesis will use OECD’s definition of ODA, this is not a problem, but rather a strength, as I am able to review several official U.S. donors and their intentions instead of just USAID.

⁶ Barbara Starr, "Obama Approves Afghanistan Troop Increase," *CNN*, February 18, 2009.

⁷ "Obama Approves Afghanistan Troop Increase."

⁸ Helen and Mark Landler Cooper, "Obama Will Speed Pullout from War in Afghanistan," *The New York Times*, June 22, 2011.

⁹ "U.S. Formally Ends the War in Afghanistan," *CBS*, December 28, 2014.

¹⁰ OECD, "Is It Oda?," <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/34086975.pdf>.

What can be discussed further is what aspects of the aid being given that can be considered to be only humanitarian aspects. Aid given for infrastructure, such as roads, may increase the standard of living/comfort in a country, but that can only follow after basic needs, such as clean water, food and accommodation. Economic efficiency must come after having sought to deliver the basic needs. According to Giles Bolton in his book *Aid and other Dirty Business*, humanitarian aid and developmental aid must be distinguished from one another:

Humanitarian aid seeks to give immediate assistance to people in desperate need [...] The objectives are quite simple: keep people from dying and help them get their lives back on track. [...] Yet humanitarian relief comprises only 5 per cent or so of the global spending on aid. [...] Development aid tries to create the opportunities [for countries] to pull themselves out of poverty for the long term.¹¹

In that sense, the aid given by the U.S. to Afghanistan can be viewed in two different ways. Humanitarian aid is according to the definition given by Bolton only a fraction of the entire gross aid, and it is used for natural disasters or refugees, in order to keep them alive. The developmental aid, on the other hand, is given in order to develop. This is a long term investment, and it is that kind of aid that is particularly interesting, as it must be well thought through before implementing it, otherwise the money will probably be wasted.

Hans Morgenthau, an important figure for the study of international relations and an authority within those fields of research, has also defined six types of aid in his 1962 article "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid"¹²: Humanitarian aid, subsistence foreign aid, military foreign aid, bribery, prestige foreign aid, and foreign aid for economic development.¹³ Humanitarian aid is according to Morgenthau used for the same purposes that Bolton describes, and is in essence non-political. At the same time, Morgenthau claims that when private foundations contribute with humanitarian aid, the aid is influenced by the political context of the country the foundations are based in.¹⁴ This means that humanitarian aid contributed by private foundations in essence is non-political, but the reasoning for where and what aid to contribute with may be influenced by the political context of the country in which the foundation is based. In other words, the official U.S. aid given by the government also tends to be non-political according to Morgenthau's distinction. For this thesis, the main

¹¹ Giles Bolton, *Aid and Other Dirty Business* (London: Ebury Press, 2008), 75-76.

¹² Hans Morgenthau, "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid," *American Political Science Review* 56, no. 2 (1962).

¹³ "A Political Theory," 301.

¹⁴ "A Political Theory," 301.

focus will be on what Morgenthau calls aid for economic development, but that type of aid may involve bribery:

Much of what goes by the name of foreign aid today is in the nature of bribes. The transfer of money and services from one government to another performs here the function of a price paid for political services rendered or to be rendered. These bribes differ from the traditional ones [(publicly accepted and granted bribes/subsidisation)] in two respects: they are justified primarily in terms of foreign aid for economic development, and money and services are transferred through elaborate machinery fashioned for genuine economic aid. In consequence, these bribes are a less effective means for the purpose of purchasing political favors than were the traditional ones.¹⁵

Simultaneously, Morgenthau claims that because of the wealth of developed nations, there is a universal expectation that they aid less developed and poor nations to raise their standard of living, “[...] aside from humanitarian aid and military foreign aid, the only kind of transfer of money and services which seems to be legitimate is one ostensibly made for the purpose of economic development.”¹⁶

Prestige foreign aid, which is to help underdeveloped nations with technological advancement and equipment, is held as a viable solution by developed industrial countries. But, according to Morgenthau, this is partly an illusion: “[...] virtually all underdeveloped nations want to appear as having achieved industrialization, while only a fraction of the population, and frequently only small elite groups within it, seek the social and economic benefits of industrialization.”¹⁷ The effect of such technological advancement is according to Morgenthau mainly psychological and political and not contributing to development. Prestige aid is mainly beneficial for the donating nation. It builds strong relationships with the receiving nation because the elite, which often is a decisive actor for the receiving nation’s policies, is the group of people in that nation that wants to achieve a psychological and political advancement. Such an investment is also often cheap for the donating nation.¹⁸

To conclude, foreign aid in this thesis is defined as aid that fulfils the requirements made by the DAC for what is called ODA. For a further definition of aid that is covered by the description of ODA, Bolton’s division of humanitarian aid and development aid applies, where this thesis main focus will be on development aid. Within development aid the thesis will follow Morgenthau’s six types of aid, in which the main focus will be on aid for

¹⁵ "A Political Theory," 302.

¹⁶ "A Political Theory," 302.

¹⁷ "A Political Theory," 304.

¹⁸ "A Political Theory," 304.

economic development. Although that is the focus, as discussed above, aid for economic development can contain traces of bribery, military aid, prestige aid, etc.

1.3 Defining self-interest

Self-interest is a nonspecific term with a wide range, and therefore it needs to be defined in greater extent than other terms within this thesis. It is also necessary because this thesis will discuss American interests in relation to American foreign policy traditions, U.S. foreign policy, and the aid efforts in Afghanistan (2007-2012). It is necessary to justify the definition with political practice as policy decides the allocation of aid. At the same time, political practice is not necessarily consistent, and therefore it is necessary to discuss some aspects of American foreign policy and decisions on allocation of foreign aid to further explore the term self-interest. It is also necessary to make an effort to connect political practice to previous specific political decisions, in order to establish whether or not these decisions have created a precedent for later political practice. To give an exact definition for this thesis, according to the description above, it is necessary to present Machiavellian realpolitik, which then will be connected to American political practice using the Truman Doctrine. The Truman Doctrine will lead to arguments about how foreign aid is influenced by policy and realpolitik. After that it is necessary to discuss examples of foreign aid being affected by realpolitik, before concluding the definition of self-interest within the scope of this thesis.

Realpolitik stems from Niccolò Machiavelli's book *The Prince*, where he gives a thorough description of how to best attain and preserve a principality.¹⁹ Machiavelli's ideas are known today as the foundation of realpolitik, but it is important to note that his book was written in a different context than realpolitik is used today. Some of the principles may not apply to today's modern world, which will be discussed further at a later point. The general idea of realpolitik described in *The Prince* is a strategy and not a theory.²⁰ Realpolitik can arguably be said to stem from realism, where realpolitik is the pragmatic strategy that one can use when being convinced by the traits of realism. Machiavelli thereby presents a way of maximizing the positive outcome of a situation according to what resources and abilities one has. There are several factors that influence the decisions one must take in order to become a "prince", or rather a leader. These factors are not necessary to discuss for this thesis, but the

¹⁹ Niccolò Machiavelli and Peter Constantine, *The Prince*, Il Principe (London: Vintage books, 2008).

²⁰ Jens Duus Rodin, "Amerikansk Utenrikspolitikk Og Den "Arabiske Våren" : En Teoretisk Analyse Av Obama-Administrasjonens Tilnærming Til Egypt, Libya Og Bahrain" (Universitetet i Oslo, 2013).

general point is that one must consider all factors that can influence the outcome of a conflict in order to achieve the maximum positive outcome, which is utility maximisation.

Machiavelli's view on the world of politics is that "... men are wicked and not prepared to keep their word to you, [therefore] you have no need to keep your word to them."²¹ In other words, no person is exclusively good, which means that to optimize one's position one must do so by acting with one's own resources, as no other person can be trusted. This further underlines the modern realpolitik in the sense that the international political arena is anarchic, thereby it is not possible to trust another state completely and a state can only look out for itself. This is in many ways an egotistical practice where one's own utility maximization must be the only focus and an ethical evaluation of others utility cannot be part of the equation, as this may prevent you from maximizing your own utility. Machiavelli was preoccupied with declaring that his ideas on how to attain and preserve a principality were realistic and practical:

Many have imagined republics and principalities that have never been seen or heard of, because how one lives and how one ought to live are so far apart that he who spurns what is actually done for what ought to be done will achieve ruin rather than his own preservation.²²

With this Machiavelli meant that ideas are good as long as they are achievable, but rather than trying out ideas of governing, which one does not know will work, it is better to do what one already know is possible, underlining the pragmatic realism that is realpolitik.

It is fair to claim that the realpolitik that is presented in *The Prince* can be a guide to dictatorship, but the fact is that Machiavelli explained that there are several ways of attaining and preserving a principality.²³ As one may encounter difficulties decided by Fortune, one may have to alter one's strategy, which means that a prince may have to deviate from the original strategy that enabled him to attain a principality.²⁴ This shows that Machiavelli was open for several approaches to governing strategies, proving he was not only writing a guide to dictatorship, as well as underlining that realpolitik is a pragmatic strategy for attaining and governing a state. What one may ask now is how realpolitik is connected to American foreign policy and foreign aid. This will be proven by discussing the criteria of the Truman Doctrine, derived from president Harry S. Truman's address to the 80th Congress in 1947, which

²¹ Machiavelli and Constantine, *The Prince*, 65.

²² *The Prince*, 55.

²³ *The Prince*, 76.

²⁴ *The Prince*, 78.

contains references to both foreign policy and foreign aid, further linking the matter of discussion to the topic of this thesis.²⁵

Truman's address (which later formed the Truman Doctrine) was presented on the basis of Greece being in desperate need of economic aid in the aftermath of WWII, and as a consequence of Greece's need of aid, Turkey was also in need of aid to prevent anxiousness in the Middle East.²⁶ The Greek government turned to the American government for aid, where Truman saw this as a necessity in order for "...Greece to survive as a free nation."²⁷ The focus on Greece, Turkey and other European nations to survive as free nations is of much importance for Truman's argumentation for allocating foreign aid. Truman claims that a militant minority threatens the stability of the Greek society, as well as devastation after the war, but more importantly that the militant minority is "... lead by Communists."²⁸ American fear of communism was at large after WWII as the Soviet Union grew and gained power within several former sovereign states in Europe, but also reaching parts of the Middle East. The main goal of aiding Greece was to help it "... become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy".²⁹ The keywords one can take from Truman's address are thus liberty, democracy, and the fight against communism. To help Greece and Turkey obtain this Truman believed that the "... help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes."³⁰ In other words, foreign aid was essential for the American ability to influence and aid European states to economic progress and political detachment from communism.

The Truman Doctrine contains aspects of liberty, democracy, foreign aid, and the fight against communism. The initial address to the Congress formed a consensus for American foreign policy, as well as how and why to allocate foreign aid to several European and Asian countries. To link the Truman Doctrine to realpolitik it is necessary to carefully analyse the wording of Truman's address, as well as the attitudes toward the subject of discussion:

... [It] is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples ... undermine the foundations of international peace and hence he security of the United States. ... It is necessary only to glance at a map to

²⁵ Harry S. Truman, "Recommendation for Assistance to Greece and Turkey - Address of the President of the United States," (http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/doctrine/large/index.php: Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, 1947).

²⁶ "Recommendation for Assistance," 1-3.

²⁷ "Recommendation for Assistance," 1.

²⁸ "Recommendation for Assistance," 2.

²⁹ "Recommendation for Assistance," 2.

³⁰ "Recommendation for Assistance," 4.

realize that the survival and integrity of the Greek nation are of grave importance in a much wider situation.³¹

Truman speaks of the problem in a more informal way than if he meant to convince the Congress of an ideology. He states the state of the matters to be simply what they are, and provides a simple, and what is believed to be an efficient solution. Realpolitik is, as previously stated, a pragmatic political strategy (pragmatic realism) that seeks utility maximization. In order for the U.S. to have stable trading partners after WWII they were dependent on maintaining free, democratic states which were able to withstand communism; American capitalism would not be able to thrive if communism was able to spread to the Western European states. Although the political fight against communism was an important factor, the keywords liberty and democracy from Truman's speech arguably exposes an ideology.

Truman saw the best way of preventing the spread of communism, and to spread their own ideology instead, to be economic contribution through developmental aid. But contributing with aid was not enough:

The Greek Government has also asked for the assistance of experienced American administrators, economists, and technicians to insure that the financial and other aid given to Greece shall be used effectively in creating a stable and self-sustaining economy and in improving its public administration.³²

By assisting the Greek government with foreign aid, the U.S. government would be able to influence the economic direction the Greek society was going to take. They could effectively and easily influence Greece to become a capitalistic society, creating both an economic and political partner in the South-East of Europe. The political decision thereby became an easy one to take, as it would further American interests, which is a pragmatic decision. This supports the claim that American foreign policy under Truman followed a realpolitik strategy. The political strategy for foreign policy during Truman's presidency could allegedly have been established as the standard strategy for foreign policy since.

How do realpolitik and the Truman Doctrine connect with American self-interest? The Truman Doctrine sought to enable a firm defence against communism by aiding European and Asian countries both economically and bureaucratically. It also sought to create a free capitalist market that was able to be a trade partner with the American economy, as well as having political allies within certain geographical areas. Using realpolitik as a

³¹ "Recommendation for Assistance," 3-4.

³² "Recommendation for Assistance," 2.

political strategy furthered all these American interests, whereby utility maximization and pragmatism are the most prominent aspects. For this thesis this fits well as arguments for the definition of self-interest, because the Truman Doctrine used foreign aid as an instrument to fulfil American interests. Within the scope of this thesis self-interest deals with bilateral relationships, where the American government contributes with development aid. In general then, self-interest falls within the category of aid that is not allocated directly to humanitarian purposes. This category is difficult to divide into subcategories, as self-interest must fulfil criteria that give the spending of that particular money an advantage for the U.S. government, which can be exemplified with economic advantages and tactical military advantages. An economic advantage could, for instance, be getting a good deal on oil reserves, creating a possible trade partner for the future, creating an export market, etc. Tactical military advantages can i.e. be the opportunity to set up American military bases on foreign land, having a partner in conflict areas, etc. Previous examples of these two can both be found in the Marshall Plan: Getting Western Europe back on its feet meant having an export market as well as stable allies when confronting communism. The U.S. i.e. had (and still has) storage facilities in Norway for military equipment such as weapons, vehicles, etc.³³

In *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, William Appleman Williams discusses the relationship between American economics and American politics. Williams' example is the relationship between the United States and Cuba. The economic and diplomatic pressures on Cuba lead to the revolution. American leaders were not deliberately harsh on Cuba:

They believed deeply in the ideals they proclaimed, and they were sincere in arguing that their policies and actions would ultimately create a Cuba that would be responsibly self-governed, economically prosperous, and socially stable and happy. All, of course, in the image of America.³⁴

The final sentence in Williams' description of why American leaders acted as they did towards Cuba is a central point to his arguments. American bilateral relations are in most cases based on promoting American interests, particularly when investing economically. Williams also argues for the existence of elitism within the executive branch in the U.S., claiming that a narrow-sighted approach to international relations caused the revolution on Cuba, as American leaders were not capable of considering what the citizens on Cuba

³³ NRK, "USA Lagrer Stridsvogner I Trøndelag," NRK 2014.

³⁴ William Appleman Williams, Lloyd C. Gardner, and A. J. Bacevich, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, 50th anniversary ed. [new foreword by Lloyd C. Gardner ; new afterword by Andrew J. Bacevich]. ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2009), 2.

wanted. American leaders saw only one solution; form 'new' Cuba in the same mould as the U.S.³⁵

Williams argues further that American policy is guided by three conceptions, where the first two are a "... humanitarian impulse to help other people solve their problems [and] the principle of self-determination applied at the international level."³⁶ The third conception, on the other hand, is contradictory to the first two as it is an "... idea entertained by many Americans [where] one insists that other people cannot really solve their problems and improve their lives unless they go about it the same way as the United States."³⁷ This is contradictory in the sense that controlling the process of improvement is not merely based on a wish to give humanitarian help; it is rather based on a wish to form other countries in the same way as the United States, thereby also being contradictory to the aspect of self-determination.³⁸ This culminates in American economic imperialism: There is a belief that American "... domestic well-being depends upon such sustained, ever-increasing overseas economic expansion."³⁹ In other words, the expansion of the American economy is presented as vital to achieve and maintain American domestic affluence. In that sense, it is not necessarily American economic imperialism, but rather American expansionism.

To further understand why the American government see a need to impose their values on other states, it is necessary to explain what Williams describes as Weltanschauung: "a 'definition of the world combined with an explanation of how it works.'"⁴⁰ In other words, the Weltanschauung used by Williams is a description of how the American government views the world and how its decisions reflect that view. Andrew J. Bacevich, who has written the afterword of *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, points out some of the main points of Williams's Weltanschauung:

An insistence that American values are universal values[;] ... A self-serving commitment to the principle of self-determination[;] ... A penchant for externalizing evil[;] ... A reflexive predilection for demonizing adversaries[;] ... A belief that the American economy cannot function absent opportunities for external expansion and that the American political system cannot function absent prosperity[;] ... A steady, if unacknowledged drift toward militarization[;] ... An unshakable confidence in American Exceptionalism and American beneficence[.]⁴¹

³⁵ *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, 2-6.

³⁶ *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, 13.

³⁷ *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, 13.

³⁸ *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, 14.

³⁹ *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, 15.

⁴⁰ *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, 319.

⁴¹ *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, 319-20.

Most of these main points are rather self-explanatory, but some need more explaining as they stand in Bacevich's afterword. The point about self-determination is simply Williams's opinion that the U.S. expects other states to self-determine their way of operating in the same manner as the U.S. The point on externalizing evil is regarding the U.S. government believing domestic issues are related to issues abroad, thereby letting foreign policy being influenced by domestic policy. All in all, the main point of Williams's concept of the American *Weltanschauung* is the glorification of American society, meaning that every other way of governing is not as good as the American way. This idea is combined with an economic strategy which links domestic issues to external issues, leading to a constant need of intervening in foreign affairs as they influence both the American society as well as American economy. This concludes why the American government constantly sees a need to impose itself on other states' affairs.⁴² American foreign policy in light of its traditions is discussed further in section 1.8 (below).

As a consequence of the arguments above, the definition of American self-interest, when contributing with foreign aid, must be rooted in foreign aid that is allocated for other purposes than pure humanitarian help (clean water, food, tents, etc.), in which it fulfils a goal of the political strategy used by the U.S. government. Such goals may be economical, political or military, but the military aspect falls outside of the range of this thesis. Determining what is self-interest may prove to be a challenge as self-interest arguably always is present when contributing with foreign aid, but at the same time it is not necessarily a determined goal. Contributing with foreign aid may increase a state's reputation on the international political arena, as well as give state leaders a satisfaction by contributing outside of their constituted domain. Donating money to underdeveloped states may have consequences one can only identify after the aid has been used. The donating government may gain benevolence with the receiving government: The donating government may expect favours, economic trades, commitments to international political issues, etc. Within the boundaries of this thesis, identifying self-interest must be a process on the level of large unspecific goals such as increasing the level of freedom and democracy.

1.4 Why do governments contribute with foreign aid?

In order to discuss why governments contribute to foreign aid, one must review what purpose the aid serves for the donating governments. According to Carol Lancaster in *Foreign Aid*:

⁴² *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, 319-20.

Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics, foreign aid “... began as a realist response to the deepening Cold War between East and West ... eventually [creating] the basis for a new norm in relations between states.”⁴³ In other words, foreign aid’s existence as an institutional element as we know it today stems from the first years after WWII, starting particularly with the Marshall Plan, both helping Western European countries, as well as giving these countries an incentive to support the U.S. during the Cold War. Lancaster focuses on four main purposes for foreign aid: Diplomacy, development, humanitarian relief, and commercial purposes.⁴⁴ Development “... has been both a means and an end of policy” in two ways, namely to promote peace and democracy, as well as promoting a higher standard of living for poor states.⁴⁵ Aid for humanitarian relief is typically focused on disasters and times of crisis, and has as previously established by Morgenthau, the least controversial purpose as well as being the kind of aid that most often does not include traces of self-interest. The commercial purposes’ focus lies mainly on economy, whereby “... the expansion of a country’s exports and securing access to needed raw materials imports” seem most significant to Lancaster.⁴⁶

Lancaster also discusses domestic political forces that shapes foreign aid, and has divided these forces into four categories: Ideas, political institutions, interests, and the organisation of aid (within the government).⁴⁷ The organisation of aid goes off topic for this thesis and is not relevant. When looking at ideas, Lancaster focuses on two categories in particular, namely worldviews and principled beliefs.⁴⁸ Principled beliefs originate from worldviews as worldviews contribute to what arguably are constructed norms, such as “... governments of rich countries should provide aid to poor countries.”⁴⁹ Institutions as a category refers to political institutions such as voting rules, the political system (parliamentary or presidential system), and the role of legislators, and the effect they have on the aid-giving.⁵⁰

The organisation of the political system affects the number of political parties running for election, where the parliamentary system often results in more than two parties, while the presidential system often results in two parties. This can have an impact on aid-giving in the sense that fewer small parties have both differences and similarities, but also may take the

⁴³ Carol Lancaster, *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Policy* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 212.

⁴⁴ *Foreign Aid*, 13.

⁴⁵ *Foreign Aid*, 13-14.

⁴⁶ *Foreign Aid*, 14.

⁴⁷ *Foreign Aid*, 18.

⁴⁸ *Foreign Aid*, 19.

⁴⁹ *Foreign Aid*, 18-19.

⁵⁰ *Foreign Aid*, 19.

form of niche-parties whereby several of them may have a political agenda that focuses on development. A focus on development in today's globalised world will often result in a focus on global development, because the development of one country and its standard of living is linked to the global market. Rich countries may focus on themselves and increase the standard of living to a certain level, but they are inevitably dependent on other countries when it comes to raw materials and resources that are not attainable within the borders of their own country. Another argument for such wealthy countries to contribute to development with aid is the wealthy citizens chance to focus on others that do not have what is considered basic needs or rights. Interests as a domestic political force is by Lancaster divided into three sub-categories:

... those supporting commercial purposes of aid[;] ... nongovernmental organizations and public interest groups that support aid for relief, development, and related purposes[;] ... and groups with an affinity for particular foreign countries, ethnicities, or religious orientations that support aid directed to those groups and countries.⁵¹

Out of these three categories, what seem to be most interesting for this essay is particularly those supporting commercial purposes of aid. Economic agreements between a wealthy state and a poor state on import/export can give large economic advantages for both, but in particular for the wealthy country, which may be able to import cheap raw materials as part of the agreement. This creates a large incentive for wealthy states to give aid to poor states, but only if they are able to come to terms with an exploitive trade agreement.

Summarising the aspects from Lancaster's book above, one may claim the reason for governments to contribute with foreign aid is not just one reason, but a combined effect of several reasons. The idea is that the social construction of an ethically focused worldview creates incentive for rich countries to aid to poor countries. At the same time, the economic interests combined with the global economy contribute with yet another incentive to contribute to foreign aid. The global society today is also intertwined with regard to political aspects, thus aid-giving states may be able to form bonds with states within important tactical areas (geopolitics), as well as being areas with vital resources. Finally, democratic states have an incentive to give aid to authoritarian states when there is hope of leading them on a path to become democratic, thus producing better conditions for a more peaceful global society.

⁵¹ *Foreign Aid*, 21.

1.5 Theoretical framework: Typology of State-building

When reviewing the American aid efforts to Afghanistan from 2007-2012 there is a need for a framework which makes it possible to analyse the money flow. The intention of analysing the aid flow from the U.S. to Afghanistan is to identify the root cause of why aid is given, as well as to identify what U.S. self-interest the aid serves. The root cause here refers to the tactics of state-building, nation-building, or society-building. These three categories may intertwine, but at the same time they serve separate specific purposes that will be discussed later on. This thesis will not discuss the success of state-/nation-/society-building, but rather try to identify which of these three categories that the U.S. aid efforts seem to be related to.

First of all, in literature on state-building and nation-building, these two terms are being used interchangeably. The term nation-states may be the source of this, but in the contemporary world the nation-state is not limited to a common identity derived from common ancestry and culture, but it is the form that modern democracies have taken regarding the political situation, institutions, bureaucracy, etc. As will be discussed in the following paragraphs, the nation-building efforts are aimed at building a national identity, while a state-building effort mainly is aimed at building the state apparatus. Thereby the interchangeable use of the terms cannot apply for this thesis. This is mainly a statement made to remove possible misunderstandings about the use of the terms. They will be properly defined in the following paragraphs, removing any confusion regarding the terms. First I will define what state-building is, before moving on to nation-building and society-building.

Jonathan Monten, describes state-building, particularly in U.S. context, as "... attempting to create stable, self-sustaining democratic governments in foreign countries that can survive the withdrawal of external support."⁵² Monten more specifically focuses on the scope and strength of the state, as well as the connection between state-building and democracy.⁵³ Mark T. Berger defines nation-building similarly in his article "From Nation-Building to State-Building: The Geopolitics of Development, the Nation-State System and the Changing Global Order":

Nation building (or state-building) is being defined here as an eternally driven, or facilitated, attempt to form or consolidate a stable, and sometimes democratic, government over an internationally recognised national territory

⁵² Jonathan Monten, "Intervention and State-Building: Comparative Lessons from Japan, Iraq, and Afghanistan," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 656, no. 1 (2014): 175.

⁵³ "Intervention and State-Building: Comparative Lessons from Japan, Iraq, and Afghanistan," 176-77.

against the backdrop of the establishment and consolidation of the UN and the universalization of a system of sovereign nation-states.⁵⁴

What seems to be a reoccurring factor is the focus on establishing stable governments, whether the goal is to be able to withdraw external support or not. Berger does not focus on the scope and the strength of the state, but Francis Fukuyama shares Monten's focus on this. Fukuyama argues that the scope of the state is the reach of the institutions and bureaucracies within the state, while the strength is the ability to "... plan and execute policies, and to enforce laws cleanly and transparently."⁵⁵ Fukuyama particularly focuses on coercion, the monopoly of legitimate violence, claiming that this is vital in order to create a stable society.⁵⁶

The importance of monopoly of force in order to create stability is understandable, because both the ability and opportunity of sanctioning gives the citizens an incentive to follow the laws or regime policies that are created in order to avoid punishment. The issue of coercion is that it does not necessarily have to be legitimised by election or a general vote from the citizens. When looking at the citation from Berger's article above he argues that the resulting government when performing state-building is not necessarily democratic, but that is sometimes can be. Thus, there are no criteria for the citizens to legitimise coercion as part of the state-building process. This may result in an authoritarian regime and in last consequence dictatorship. Thereby state-building does not necessarily consider the rights of the citizens as it is merely focusing on the state apparatus and the ability to create stability, which differs from nation-building.

To create stability and developing a state or territory using the strategy of nation-building, focuses on establishing a national identity for the citizens, which differs from state-building. Jochen Hippler explains that nation-building was previously linked to decolonisation, while in modern times regained focus after the collapse of the Soviet Union as "... states have been falling apart, not just in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans, while other states are being created, reinvented and recognized."⁵⁷ This can be explained as a consequence of the fall of the Soviet Union, where several former sovereign states got new opportunities to form their state anew. This is a time-consuming process that cannot be rushed. Already established nation-states, such as those of Western Europe, have had a long

⁵⁴ Mark T. Berger, "From Nation-Building to State-Building: The Geopolitics of Development, the Nation-State System and the Changing Global Order," *Third World Quarterly* 27, no. 1 (2006): 6.

⁵⁵ F. Fukuyama, "The Imperative of State-Building," *J. Democr.* 15, no. 2 (2004): 21-22.

⁵⁶ "Liberalism Versus State-Building," *J. Democr.* 18, no. 3 (2007): 11.

⁵⁷ Jochen Hippler, "Ethnicity, State, and Nation-Building - Experiences, Policies and Conceptualization," Jochen Hippler, http://www.jochenhippler.de/html/ethnicity-_state-_and_nation-building.html.

time to evolve, while unstable or failed states need time to create and legitimise a national identity.

There are three processes that according to Hippler are key to the nation-building process: “creation of an integrated ideology[;] creation of an integrated society[;] creation of a functioning state apparatus.”⁵⁸ The creation of an integrated ideology can better be understood as a creation of a national identity, which can unify the different groups within the territory of the nation-state up for discussion. It is important to emphasise that these groups do not necessarily need to lose their identity, but rather that they have to agree that they have something in common, which must surpass the different group identities.⁵⁹ This is necessary in order to create a state that is stable, as well as increase the peacefulness between different groups. The next step is the creation of an integrated society, which reflects the practical conditions that need to be established. In short term these practical conditions are infrastructure in the form of transportation (e.g. roads), long distance communication (including media outlets), and an integrated national economy.⁶⁰ These requirements cannot only exist, but must “... be utilized to a significant degree.”⁶¹ The third step, creating a functioning state apparatus, is the step where the creation of a nation-state comes in. The first two steps merely create a national identity by using infrastructure such as communication in order to be able to discuss and agree on the identity. Building the state has two intertwined aspects: First, the “... respective society has constituted itself as a political identity ... and [secondly] the state has not just to be proclaimed, but it has to be functional.”⁶² This implies that there is a need for a functional financial base, personnel loyal to the state, monopoly of force, a functioning legal system, being able to function in the entire territory of the state, and most importantly it needs acceptance by the citizens.⁶³ In other words, there is a need for a self-constituted state with practical functionality, and it has to be recognized by the citizens.

The recognition of the citizens is a vital aspect that separates nation-building from state-building. While state-building mainly focuses on creating stable state functions, where coercion is a vital aspect, nation-building first and foremost focuses on the creation of a common national identity. After creating that identity there is a need for creating a state apparatus where monopoly of force is an aspect, but this needs to be recognized by the citizens. In state-building the citizens recognition is not necessary and may only stand in the

⁵⁸ "Ethnicity , State, and Nation-Building".

⁵⁹ "Ethnicity , State, and Nation-Building".

⁶⁰ "Ethnicity , State, and Nation-Building".

⁶¹ "Ethnicity , State, and Nation-Building".

⁶² "Ethnicity , State, and Nation-Building".

⁶³ "Ethnicity , State, and Nation-Building".

way of rapid development of the state. Thus, nation-building is a more time-consuming process where the preliminary requisites are just as important as the establishment of a state apparatus. Although time-consuming, nation-building may arguably be more stable over time than state-building, because after having agreed on and created a national identity it is difficult to tear down that identity. When doing state-building, there is merely a state apparatus built by the use of coercion, which is much more unstable.

As a final remark on nation-building one can discuss the terms national identity, and territoriality of a nation-state: "Is it reasonable, for instance, to try to create an Afghan or Pakistani Nation-State – or should the focus of attention rather be a Pashto Nation-state instead, because 'Afghans' and 'Pakistanis' do not exist at all, while Pashtos [sic] do?"⁶⁴ The territoriality of a state does not necessarily correlate with different groups within the state, thus it is a plausible solution to change the borders of a state in order to create the national identity with less effort and conflict. This will not be discussed in depth within this thesis, but it is an aspect that can influence the process of nation-building both regarding the level of conflict and the efficiency of the process.

A third element in my typology is society-building, which is more difficult to define. In general civil society development is viewed to "... involve support for the associational sphere of interest groups which stand between the private sphere of the family and market economy and the public sphere of the state."⁶⁵ In other words, civil society development is the sphere of society that the state is not involved in, where non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are often used as the voice of the civic community, as well as act as a link between the civic community and the state.⁶⁶ NGOs are in the case of being the link between the civic community and the state also viewed as "...part of the process of democratization."⁶⁷

The most difficult part of defining society-building is to define the civil society. The definition of civil society is highly disputed, whereas no efforts to define it have resulted in an agreement on an academic understanding of the term. At the same time, efforts have been made to define civil society, and it has also been done in the context of Afghanistan:

Civil society refers to the arena of un-coerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries

⁶⁴ "Ethnicity, State, and Nation-Building".

⁶⁵ David Chandler, "Democratization in Bosnia: The Limits of Civil Society Building Strategies," *Democratization* 5, no. 4 (1998): 79.

⁶⁶ "Democratization in Bosnia: The Limits of Civil Society Building Strategies," 79.

⁶⁷ Béatrice Pouligny, "Civil Society and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Ambiguities of International Programmes Aimed at Building 'New' Societies," *Security dialogue (trykt utg.)*. 496.

between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by organizations such as registered charities, development non-governmental organizations, community groups, women's organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, trades unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups. ... In addition there are two aspects of life which are arguably part of civil society in Afghanistan ... [namely] cultural activities ... [and] individual activities.⁶⁸

Civil society is complex, but in general it is defined as the parts of social life that are not directly connected to the state.

The ways of building or developing civic society can be narrowed down to two aspects. Firstly, individual development that refers to individual citizens' effort to build or develop civil society. Strong individuals that have a special cause of interest they wish to develop run these efforts. These interests may be shared with others, creating groups of individuals that collaborate in order to reach their goal. These individuals can work by themselves or in groups, funded by local support or by foreign governments or organisations. An important factor is that these individuals lack experience and the infrastructure of an organisation. Because of this their efforts are likely to have a low degree of efficiency as well as a short reach. The second aspect of society-building, on the other hand, revolves around NGOs, which have the necessary experience and infrastructure that widens the reach of the society-building efforts, as well as the efficiency of the work. The NGOs may do the same work as individuals, but because of the infrastructure of the organisations they may focus more on complex processes such as democratization. NGOs have the necessary experience to work with these more complex issues than committed individuals, thereby their work is able to have a wider reach, but it may lack the commitment that individual citizens have because the individuals are far more connected to the civic society being built or developed. In that sense, these two ways of performing society-building complements each other; where the first way possesses a high degree of commitment, the second possesses the necessary experience to complete the work.

⁶⁸ Elizabeth Winter, "Civil Society Development in Afghanistan," (2010), http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/NGPA/publications/winter_afghanistan_report_final.pdf.

1.6 Hypothesis and methodology

This thesis will use a combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis, with the case study of Afghanistan (2007-2012). The qualitative analysis consists of two essential parts: The first is a review of American foreign policy traditions and the specific foreign policy towards Afghanistan during 2007-2012. The second is an analysis of the relationship between foreign policy, foreign aid, the three typologies, and partly self-interest. The quantitative analysis consists of a review of the U.S. foreign aid contributions to Afghanistan during the time period 2007-2012. The quantitative analysis will serve as a backdrop for the discussion of foreign policy and foreign aid, aiming to give a deeper understanding of American foreign relations.

The case study of Afghanistan (2007-2012) is chosen because it is a modern case of foreign relations, as well as being one of the most prioritized countries for U.S. foreign aid the past decade. It is also one of the world's least developed countries, which makes it an interesting area of study as the opportunities and challenges in developing it towards a modern state are many.

The three typologies that have been presented in section 1.6 will serve as analytical tools when analysing the aid given from the U.S. to Afghanistan during the time period 2007-2012 by trying to identify what typology is best represented by the aid spending of the U.S. government. The acquired dataset consists of complete annual reports for the OECD for 2007-2012, divided by funding agency, what projects have received money, and how much money the different projects have received. These will be further explained in the next chapter. The analysis of the data will test the following hypotheses:

- *Hypothesis 1 (H1) – The American government's aid effort in Afghanistan (2007-2012), was related to state-building.*
- *Hypothesis 2 (H2) – The American government's aid effort in Afghanistan (2007-2012) was related to nation-building.*
- *Hypothesis 3 (H3) – The American government's aid effort in Afghanistan (2007-2012) was related to society-building.*
- *Hypothesis 4 (H4) – The American government's aid effort in Afghanistan (2007-2012) was related to state-building, nation-building, and society-building.*

1.7 American foreign policy traditions

Brendon O'Connor, in his article "American foreign policy traditions: A literature review", discusses the term political tradition as well as what American foreign policy traditions exists. O'Connor's article is a literature review of the subject and is a credible source for a discussion on American foreign policy traditions. It will be used in order to establish what different traditions have been established and how they are used today. This is a preparation for a later discussion in chapter three on the relationship between the American aid efforts in Afghanistan (2007-2012), the three typologies state-, nation-, and society-building, and the American policy towards Afghanistan 2007-2012.

The study of political traditions is according to O'Connor "... an examination of how the past informs the present."⁶⁹ Traditions may vanish after becoming outdated, but old traditions may still be influential for centuries.⁷⁰ These traditions may compete or intersect, and are often "... the bridge between intellectuals and political practitioners."⁷¹ O'Connor observes that American people are fond of traditions and, with reference to Walter Russell Mead, he writes:

'This respect for national tradition is one of our stronger and most valuable traits. It is based on two different elements: and admiration for founding principles based on the degree to which the enlightened ideas of the Revolutionary era still commend themselves to the American mind, and a sober historical recognition that under the guidance of the American Republic has enjoyed far happier political and material existence any other commonwealth of comparable size in the history of the world'.⁷²

In other words, the American relationship to traditions is very strong and rooted in the foundation of the U.S. as well as the view of the USA being the most prosperous commonwealth ever having existed. O'Connor further stresses the importance of "... solid evidence of strong resonance and an influence over time ... [and] that there is a hierarchy of traditions; not every tradition can command the same level of influence."⁷³ This adds to the aspect of the use of a tradition for a significant amount of time, as well as the aspect of the difference in relevance of the traditions.

Walter McDougal divides American foreign policy into two periods, the Old Testament and the New Testament:

⁶⁹ Brendon O'Connor, "American Foreign Policy Traditions: A Literature Review," The United States Studies Centre (www.usssc.edu.au: University of Sydney, 2009), 2.

⁷⁰ "American Foreign Policy Traditions," 2.

⁷¹ "American Foreign Policy Traditions," 2.

⁷² "American Foreign Policy Traditions," 2.

⁷³ "American Foreign Policy Traditions," 3.

The Old Testament approach sees America as the promised land where republican liberty can be preserved if America knows its limitations and keeps the rest of the world out of its affairs. In opposition, the 'New Testament traditions define America as Crusader State called to bring the salvation to a world ravaged by revolution and war.'⁷⁴

Anatol Levien claims that because of "...messianic and exceptionalist beliefs, America is more than a country – it is an ideology."⁷⁵ In my opinion it is important to understand American Exceptionalism when reviewing foreign policy because it arguably is the source of what McDougal calls the "Crusader State," and also Levien's notion of the American ideology. The American governmental system is unique, and has in my opinion become the source of American expansionism in the sense that spreading freedom and democracy are of the most vital aspects of American foreign policy. As noted earlier, when referring to Williams and the U.S. commitment to Cuba in the 1950s, the whole point of the commitment was to rebuild Cuba in the image of America. This underlines the point that American Exceptionalism and foreign policy is tightly connected because foreign policy was based on spreading American ideals on the assumption that the American system was essential in order for Cuba to become a state with the same level of development as the United States.

Walter Russell Mead "... suggests that the history of American foreign policy is better understood with reference to four traditions: Hamiltonianism, Jeffersonianism, Jacksonianism and Wilsonianism."⁷⁶ These four traditions are all central themes in Mead's book *Special Providence: American foreign policy and how it changed the world*, and have also been explained in other articles written by Mead, such as "American Grand Strategy in a World at Risk". Mead describes the background of the four traditions, which all are connected to what he calls a British Legacy.⁷⁷ The elements inherited by the British are specifically:

[A] monopoly in the Western Hemisphere, along with balances of power in the chief theaters of the world ... Second is sea and air power, which enables the United States to exert force in all areas where its interests may be threatened ... The third element of U.S. grand strategy is its objective of transforming international politics. Washington is not always clear on what it is trying to do in this regard, but in general it wants the world to be more democratic than it is, since this would make America feel safer.⁷⁸

⁷⁴ "American Foreign Policy Traditions," 5.

⁷⁵ "American Foreign Policy Traditions," 6.

⁷⁶ "American Foreign Policy Traditions," 9.

⁷⁷ Walter Russell Mead, "American Grand Strategy in a World at Risk," *Orbis* 49, no. 4 (2005): 590.

⁷⁸ "American Grand Strategy in a World at Risk," 590-91.

Mead also observes a strategic hierarchy, meaning that the United States has a priority of which regions are most important for the foreign policy. These regions are Europe, East Asia and the Middle East.⁷⁹ Since 9/11, Mead observes a shift in priority for these regions, where it previously was Europe, East Asia, Middle East it is now Middle East, East Asia, and Europe. Another thing Mead observes is how the intensity of U.S. foreign policy has changed after 9/11, especially in the willingness of the citizens in relation to engage in actions on foreign territories.⁸⁰

The final change in American foreign policy that Mead observes is in the political foundation, where he introduces the four traditions. He writes: “[all] four schools are deeply rooted in the American experience ... The four schools are not blood types, with every individual typed by one and only one label.”⁸¹ The first tradition is the Hamiltonian school, which is economically driven. According to Mead it “... sees the task of the American government as promoting the health of American enterprise at home and abroad.”⁸² Mead further explains that there is a strong relation between the government and big business for Hamiltonians in order to achieve stability at home and to be able to effectively act abroad, which also implies a wish for a globalized economy.

The second tradition is the Wilsonian school, which believes that “... the United States has both a moral obligation and an important national interest in spreading American democratic and social values throughout the world, creating a peaceful international community that accepts the rule of law.”⁸³ Furthermore, Mead claims that this position stems from a belief that the spreading of American values is vital in order to hold American interests.

The third tradition is the Jeffersonian school, which focuses more on protecting American values in the domestic territory rather than spreading democracy abroad, meaning that it has a focus on low cost and low level of danger in order to protect American values.⁸⁴

The fourth and final tradition is the Jacksonian school, where the “... most important goal of the U.S. government in both foreign and domestic policy should be the physical security and the economic well-being of the American people.”⁸⁵ Mead further explains that this should be achieved by not provoking foreign states. But, if there are wars where the

⁷⁹ "American Grand Strategy in a World at Risk," 591.

⁸⁰ "American Grand Strategy in a World at Risk," 592.

⁸¹ "American Grand Strategy in a World at Risk," 593.

⁸² "American Grand Strategy in a World at Risk," 593.

⁸³ "American Grand Strategy in a World at Risk," 594.

⁸⁴ "American Grand Strategy in a World at Risk," 594.

⁸⁵ "American Grand Strategy in a World at Risk," 594.

United States has interests it should participate, in which the only alternative is to win. In relation to the evolvement of these traditions Mead writes:

While interest groups, regions, and to some degree the economic interests that each school reflects have remained more or less constant through the generations, the policy proposals and priorities of the four schools have developed over time in response to historical, social, and economic changes, both within the United States and beyond its borders.⁸⁶

This means that the situation today (post-9/11) has laid the foundation for the Jacksonian tradition. Mead claims that the strategic actions made by the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan were correct, but the tactics of the actions were not necessarily successful.⁸⁷ This also meant a change in how the U.S. dealt with Europe as they no longer saw it necessary to confer with the European state leaders before acting, which also applies for the international organisations, partly also because the international organisations can be viewed as dysfunctional.⁸⁸

1.8 Conclusion

The American foreign policy tradition has been criticized for being "... naïve and unsophisticated."⁸⁹ Referring to Massachusetts' congressman Fisher Ames, O'Connor claims that this is a misunderstanding because, at that time, the new and inventive system of government in the older European kingdoms did not understand the differences between the consistencies of a republic.⁹⁰ U.S. foreign policy is characterized by having competing policies, while the European standard is to have a unified policy. When considering foreign policy today this is still the case; the American foreign policy has a possibility to change with the election of a new president, while in i.e. Norway the main decisions on foreign policy is not decided by the government, but by the parliament. Norwegian foreign policy has a mantra to be consistent and consensual, and the political parties that are forming the government normally cannot alter this in any large degree.⁹¹ In the U.S. the elected government, run by the president, holds the foreign policy decisions.

Moving between multiple foreign policies is related to American self-interests and the realpolitik that American foreign policy executes. Foreign policy interests change with the

⁸⁶ "American Grand Strategy in a World at Risk," 595.

⁸⁷ "American Grand Strategy in a World at Risk," 596.

⁸⁸ "American Grand Strategy in a World at Risk," 596-97.

⁸⁹ O'Connor, "American Foreign Policy Traditions," 4.

⁹⁰ "American Foreign Policy Traditions," 4.

⁹¹ Aksel J. and Karl-Eirik Kval Mellbye, "Politikk Og Makt," (2012), <http://politikkogmakt-versjon2.cappelendamm.no>.

changing regional and national situations abroad. American foreign policy is dependent on being able to float different policies over time, as there is a belief in the connection between American domestic affairs and foreign events. Thus, the president's ability to alter foreign policy according to situations abroad is vital for American interests. American self-interest is rooted in pragmatism and ideology. The ideology is deeply rooted in democracy and freedom, and these aspects have been important factors when promoting American values abroad. Realpolitik has become the instrument for promoting these values, thus pragmatic realism is the utmost used tactic in foreign relations. The use of realpolitik has a changing pattern in connection with the situation abroad and will continue to evolve according to future changes.

The Presidents' foreign policy decisions are also connected to competing American foreign policy traditions. Different presidents have supported their foreign policy on the four different policy traditions described by Mead (section 1.8). There is a relationship between a president's view of the relevant foreign relations and the foreign policy tradition he seems to follow. Because the four traditions are so diverse, it is possible for different presidents to hold the view of one of them within their presidency, while for the next elected president foreign relations may change, and thereby the grounds for his foreign policy will change which will divert him to another foreign policy tradition.

The state-building strategies described in section 1.6 are also connected to the competing foreign policies of a president and his administration. They are in essence a consequence of the realpolitik considerations the administration have to take, which are dictated according to the foreign policy tradition the president's administration falls under. Whether the focus is on doing the job at home (Jeffersonianism and Jacksonianism) or abroad (Hamiltonianism and Wilsonianism), if it is economically driven (Hamiltonianism and Jacksonianism) or ideologically driven (Wilsonianism and Jeffersonianism), the foreign policy tradition that dictates the president's administration will influence the priority of state-building strategies. A foreign focus, i.e. Wilsonianism, will focus on spreading freedom and democracy in order to create peaceful societies. In long-term contexts nation-building will prove the best state-building strategy as it builds a strong and secure state, but it is costly and thereby a Jeffersonian administration will not see it possible to do so as it is both working abroad as well as depriving the domestic American economy of large funds. Overall, the president and his administration work as a buckle on a strap that holds it all together.

2 An analysis of U. S. Foreign aid to Afghanistan from 2007 to 2012

2.1 Introduction to the quantitative data

The U.S. effort to contribute with developmental aid to Afghanistan was immense, which is evident through the total amount of aid being given for the period 2007-2012. During that time the U.S. gave more than \$15 billion to Afghanistan.⁹² USAID were given the task to create reports for OECD regarding ODA, whereby they created per annum data sheets which they combined into a publicly available document, accessible at their website.⁹³ This document contains ODA given to all nations, for the years 2007-2012, making it is an extensive document containing a large amount of data. Because this thesis concerns aid to Afghanistan alone, I selected projects that were only implemented in Afghanistan, 687 projects titles in all. Some of these projects were funded only for one year, others were funded for several years, and some were funded per annum for the entire researched period. For this thesis I have divided the projects into three main groups representing the typologies introduced in the theoretical framework: State-building, nation-building and society-building. This requires a large amount of research, as it is necessary investigate out what purposes of the different projects had. At the same time, there are several project titles in the data that are related to one another, thereby it is possible to generalize somewhat when dividing the projects into the three typologies. One also has to keep in mind that the scope of a master thesis has to be somewhat narrow in order to perform a complete analysis. Therefore, there are some developmental aid projects that cannot be reviewed in depth within this specific amount of work, but the general focus of the different project groups will be taken into account.

2.2 Dividing the data according to the typologies

The quantitative data consists of four variables: The recipient country, project title, extending agency name, and the per annum contribution to the projects (spread out over the years 2007-

⁹² See Table 1.

⁹³ USAID, "U.S. Oda Disbursements by Recipient Country and U.S. Agency," ed. USAID(http://usoda.eads.usaidallnet.gov/data/files/us_official_development_assistance.xls2013).

2012).⁹⁴ The variables are classified differently in which the recipient country variable, the project title variable, and the extending agency name variable are on the nominal scale, hence being qualitative variables. The per annum contribution on the other hand, is a quantitative variable on the ratio scale. This means that the only variable that can be measured quantitatively is the per annum contribution variable.

The data are divided according to the three typologies presented in the introduction, state-building, nation-building and society-building. In order to establish the purpose of the projects it is necessary to research the different project titles. The result of this is that some projects are difficult or impossible to divide into one of the three typologies, creating two more categories: Those projects impossible to divide into any of the typologies, and economic projects that are not related to nation-building.

State-building projects

In accordance with the definition of state-building, the identification of projects that fall under this typology are projects aiming to build a minimum of state apparatus, which is able to have a scope and strength. Projects that enable the state apparatus to reach out to institutions and to create and enforce laws are those related to state-building. When reviewing the dataset there are several projects related to state-building, especially those related to enforcement of laws and the ability to monopolize force.⁹⁵ Some examples of the ability to enforce laws are the training of Afghan personnel to cope with police work, anti-narcotics programs and training, and border enforcement. Regarding the ability to monopolize force, there are mainly projects which focus on weapon control, meaning the police forces would not have to cope with civilians having guns, making them the major source of force in Afghanistan. There are also some projects related to building the state apparatus and enabling the executive legislation to do their work, hence the scope of the state.

Nation-building projects

Nation-building focuses on building a national society and economy with emphasis on tying together all parts of the country. This means that within the dataset the projects related to rebuilding or building infrastructure, for such purposes as transportation and communication as well as necessary basic needs (i.e. water and sanitation), are related to the nation-building typology. The state-apparatus may overlap with state-building, but in the case of comparing

⁹⁴ "U.S. Oda Disbursements by Recipient Country and U.S. Agency."

⁹⁵ See appendix for a list of all the projects that are classified as state-building.

nation-building with state-building, nation-building has a larger focus on the state being recognized by the citizens and for the citizens to collaborate on the creation of a national identity. Thus, projects that i.e. are meant to do conflict mitigation are also nation-building projects.

The projects related to nation-building may be classified as basic economy formation, conflict mitigation, infrastructural development, and media formation. Infrastructure is, as previously stated, a predisposition in order to be able to create a national identity, whereby basic needs are necessary to be covered in order to be able to discuss a national identity (water and food must come first). Also, transportation and communication is important predispositions that enable tribal communities to communicate where they have not been able to before. Conflict mitigation is a vital part of getting tribal communities to sort out their differences, creating the necessary foundation for a national identity. The media is a source of communication and the creation of awareness in Afghanistan, making it intertwine with communication as an infrastructure because the media communicates with the Afghan citizens. It is important to stress that the projects in the data that are related to media are meant to help build independent media. As I am not able to measure if the media actually is independent or not, the purpose of the projects are used as argumentation for dividing the media-related projects among the typologies.

Society-building projects

Society-building involves individuals or groups that are building a pluralistic society based on citizenship in the current western model, often by the use of NGOs, where the state is not involved in the issues being dealt with. This implies that the projects involving support for NGOs, related to the civil society rather than building of the state apparatus, are the projects related to society-building. Projects involving infrastructure (roads, communication, etc.) will usually include the state in some way, as the government must maintain the infrastructure, be it local or state level. The main project groups related to society-building are thus cultural projects, projects that support certain groups of society (such as women and victims of violence), reintegration done by private organisations, humanitarian aid, privately funded healthcare projects, and similar projects. Within the dataset there are particularly two general project titles (they both have a lot of subtitles) aimed at the civil society: Title II Food Aid, funded by USAID, and National Endowment for Democracy (NED), funded by the U.S. Department of State. Title II Food aid is a food program (humanitarian help), while NED is a private organisation that works for spreading democracy. Although NED is funded through

the Department of State, it acts as a private actor in Afghanistan, which makes the work related to society-building.

Economic projects not related to nation-building

Some of the economic projects in the dataset are not related to nation-building, and because of the purpose of the projects, they are difficult to ascribe to any of the three typologies. Because of this they will be left out of this analysis to enable a conclusion that is not conflicted by projects that may have been wrongly ascribed to any of the typologies.

Projects that are impossible to divide into typologies

Finally, there are some projects that are difficult to ascribe to any of the three typologies because there is lack of descriptions of the purpose of the projects. After meticulous research it is not possible to find any answer to what the purpose of these projects are, and thereby they must be left out of the analysis as they may be a source of error. Many of these projects are titled “administration and oversight” and the extending agency for these projects was USAID. After several attempts to find the purpose of these projects without results, they are ascribed as costs for USAID’s administration, and keeping an oversight on the many projects they have going on in Afghanistan. Such money, not going to the Afghan society or state, does not belong in this research as it does not say anything about the purpose of American developmental aid, and thereby will be left out.

2.3 Reliability and validity

It is important to use reliable and valid data when performing quantitative analysis in order for the results of the analysis to be plausible and relevant for other researchers. The data being used are official data sheets delivered for official purposes from the U.S. government, via USAID, to the DAC, where they are to be reviewed. Therefore the data must be said to be highly trustworthy, but it is also important to keep in mind that the data being used are downloaded as a standard Microsoft Excel document where errors may occur. This is difficult to test or prove, revealing a possible source of error in the analysis. On the other hand, considering the source of the data, the reliability of the data is arguably very good because it is used to report to OECD.

The validity of the use of the data is another matter entirely, and it is more difficult to determine with such certainty as with the reliability of the data. In this thesis the data is used

to try to identify which of the three typologies the U.S. government are related to when donating development aid for Afghanistan (2007-2012). It is also a goal to identify what the self-interest was for the American government when contributing with development aid to Afghanistan. I will approach this by analysing the relation between the different aid projects and the money being spent. It is possible to assume that there is a relation between the amount of projects, the amount of money contributed to each project, and thereby to each typology after having distributed the projects per typology. What may be an issue is the distribution of projects according to the typologies, because there is a large amount of data needing to be researched and analysed in order to divide the projects into three categories. This may involve traces of subjective justification, as several project descriptions may be related to several of the typologies, so in order to present results decisions must be made to make the data applicable for the analysis. Although this may be a source of error, or at least subjective opinion, it is vital to stress that this research and analysis is done as objectively as possible. The inner logic of this research is sound and will provide a conclusion that is viable and able to withstand criticism against the inner logic, but there is a possibility that the research may not be agreeable for academics with different views and different approaches to the subject.

Another potential source of error is that the research uses the intended purpose of the different projects in order to distribute them among the typologies. Because it is difficult to test the actual impact of the projects, it is also difficult to use to use them in another way than using the intended purpose. The problem with this is that i.e. the intended building of an independent media may actually not be independent. The purpose of the research is not to measure if the projects are successful, but rather to analyse the purpose of American developmental aid and to identify which of the three typologies that the American government relates to, thus the success of the aid projects is an entirely different research project.

2.4 The use of the data


The data is firstly presented in total, then by typology, and finally they will be compared across typologies. The presentation of the numbers in total includes a distribution of aid in total for 2007-2012, as well as for the extending agencies. It also introduces the distribution per typology. The presentation by typology includes a presentation of the allocated aid for each typology, the number of projects, the median distribution per project and the distribution

per agency for the typology being analysed. The comparison across the typologies uses the previously presented data in order to compare them and analyse the differences.

2.5 Total distributions

2.5.1 Total distribution of U.S. aid to Afghanistan (2007-2012)

The amount of U.S. Dollars spent in Afghanistan increased significantly from 2007 to 2009, where the amount of aid was quite stable until 2012, where it dropped again. From 2007 to 2009 the amount of aid increased by 96,79 per cent, in other words it came very close to



Graph 1

being doubled in two years. What can then be discussed is why this happened, and where the extra funding went. What immediately comes to mind is that the situation in Afghanistan may have changed during those years in the sense that the U.S. commitment in Afghanistan increased. Another point may be that the U.S. government struggled to have an impact on the Afghan society when trying to help, and that the huge increase in aid was an aggressive strategy to fulfil the goals that the U.S. government had set for itself. In that sense, the U.S. government might have seen no other option than to ‘invest’ a lot more money in Afghanistan in order to make an impact, or fulfil their goals. The dip in 2012 can also suggest that the possible aggressive strategy did not work, thereby there being no point in continuing the vast disbursement of U.S. aid in Afghanistan. Another factor can be that the U.S. government saw its commitment in Afghanistan as decreasing, especially with regard to the withdrawal of military personnel, thereby resulting in a lack of necessity to spend such a vast amount of money in Afghanistan. What needs to be noted is that the decrease in given aid

from 2011 to 2012 was not as large as the increase from 2007 to 2009. Therefore, it may be that expensive project(s) had been finished, or in effect scaled down with regard to funding. There are traces of this pattern in the data when comparing some of the top ten projects in 2011 and 2012. For example, the second highest funded project in 2011, “Conflict Mitigation,” decreased in funding by more than \$ 140 million from 2011 to 2012. “Transport Services” had a decrease of more than \$ 77 million from 2011 to 2012. There are also similar examples where there was a large decrease in funding from 2011 to 2012 that are outside of the ‘top ten’ tables. At the same time, there is a need to point out that “Public Sector Executive Function” increased from 2011 to 2012 by more than \$273 million, which covers the decrease of the two projects mentioned above. In other words, the decrease of funding for some projects was balanced by the increase of funding for other projects, perhaps indicating an important point; the U.S. government must also balance their foreign aid budget, thereby needing to take funding for one project in order to fund another. In other words, it is a question of priorities for the U.S. government.

2.5.2 Distribution per agency

The distribution by extending agency name consists of the allocated aid per year, for the different agencies, sorted by the ascending total amount of aid given for 2007-2012 (Table 1), before distributing the projects per typology (leaving some projects uncategorized), meaning that these numbers consist of the total allocated aid for Afghanistan for the years 2007-2012.

U.S. aid to Afghanistan by extending agency name, per allocated year 2007-2012 (million USD)

Extending Agency Name	Allocated aid per year						Total 2007-2012 per agency
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	
U.S. Agency for International Development	921,94122	1181,32349	1789,06965	1993,36039	2185,96331	1952,15312	10023,81118
Department of State	115,79749	210,43811	336,62284	459,21099	333,30265	507,88047	1963,25255
Department of the Army	205,38742	485,30112	548,35386	316,05324	0	0	1555,09564
Department of Defense	240,103	204,123	276,16357	0	521,42996	280,43502	1522,25455
Department of Agriculture	13,06101	20,86099	18,88471	116,97603	26,84853	23,47244	220,10371
Department of Health and Human Services	16,25314	7,34591	6,26075	3,1663	1,24984	0,32168	34,59762
Department of the Treasury	0,36579	0,06204	0,49119	2,64274	3,4367	2,06392	9,06238
Department of Transportation	0	0	0	0	1,41518	6,6977	8,11288
Department of Justice	0	0,26985	3,3452	0,59864	0,30799	0,04916	4,57084
Trade and Development Agency	1,19528	1,09646	0,72261	0,25	0,156	0	3,42035
Department of Labor	0	0,65	0	1,1	0	0	1,75
Department of Commerce	0	0	0	0	0,88733	0	0,88733
Department of Energy	0,17932	0,1	0,00208	0,01879	0	0	0,30019
Department of Homeland Security	0	0,01132	0	0	0	0,07395	0,08527
Total	1514,28367	2111,58229	2979,91646	2893,37712	3074,99749	2773,14746	15347,30449

Table 1

There are some interesting aspects to be discussed regarding Table 1. First of all, and not surprisingly considering it is the Agency for International Development, USAID was the agency that distributed most American aid during the years researched. They distributed more than 65,31 per cent of the allocated aid during 2007-2012, while the agency that distributed second to most aid distributed 12,79 per cent. The Department of State, the Department of the Army, and the Department of Defence all contributed with at least \$ 1 500 million, while the rest of the extending agencies contributed with significantly less aid.

Because USAID is the American government's agency for international development they contribute with aid for different societal sectors, such as infrastructure, health, education, economic development, political development, etc. The consequence is that when analysing American foreign aid, most allocated aid was distributed by USAID, but that does not mean that the other agencies were of less importance. What is more interesting is to uncover what specific projects received most money from the U.S. Because the goal is to reveal which of the three typologies the U.S. government prioritized and whether or not these priorities changed during the researched period, the projects are the main selection for the analysis of U.S. aid given to Afghanistan. The reason being that the projects' purposes enable the identification of which typology the U.S. government was related to. The agencies were funding or distributing the money for the projects and are under no circumstances insignificant, but in this study they are less significant than the projects. With that being said, the agencies are discussed, but only as part of the discussion about the projects. The reason for presenting the distribution by extending agency is to show how the different agencies contributed to American ODA in Afghanistan, but also because it is the most orderly way of presenting the grand totals of each year and the shift in how much aid was given during the researched years.

2.5.3 Distribution per typology

The distribution per typology (Table 2) is a result of carefully analysing the purpose of the projects in relation to the definition of each typology, thereby dividing them into four categories, one for each of the typology and one for the projects that are impossible to divide between the typologies.

Total amount of allocated aid (million USD)

Period of time	State-building	Nation-building	Society-building	Total
2007-2012	4548,16311	6392,26371	3034,51859	13974,94541

Table 2

The distribution per typology immediately reveals some interesting observations, whereby the first is the difference in total allocated aid when comparing it to the distribution per agency. The difference between the total of two distributions is the amount of aid spent on the projects that are difficult or impossible to classify according to the definition of the typologies. As discussed earlier, this is a source of error because a large amount of money is not taken into consideration when analysing the numbers. At the same time, it would be a greater source of error if it was included, because it would possibly create a wrong illustration of the amount of aid allocated for each of the typologies. The second observation that reveals itself when looking at Table 2 is the difference in aid given per typology. Nation-building projects clearly received the most aid with as much as 46 % of the total amount of aid being given for the typologies. State-building projects received 33 % of the total amount of aid, while society-building projects received 22 % of the total amount of aid.


Percentage of Table 2

Period of time	State-building	Nation-building	Society-building	Total
2007-2012	33 %	46 %	22 %	100 %

Table 3

This presentation of the numbers implies that the U.S. government in the largest degree were contributing to nation-building, and in the least degree contributed to society-building when contributing with developmental aid to Afghanistan. It also implies that the U.S. government's aid contribution was related to more than only one of the typologies, thereby also implying that the answer to the research question is complex.

There are also interesting initial observations when reviewing the allocation of aid for the typologies per annum:



Graph 2

Except from 2010, society-building was the least prioritised when it comes to aid spending for 2007-2012. The spending on society-building projects had a fairly even upward trend until 2011 where it fell considerably to 63 % of what was spent in 2011. This is also the case for nation-building projects, which in 2012 received only 53 % of what was donated for nation-building projects in 2011. State-building, on the other hand, increased with 60 % from 2011 to 2012, meaning that there seems to have been a shift in priority to what the U.S. government related to of the three typologies. The fall for nation-building also seems to have been a trend from 2010 to 2012. On average, it is observable that nation-building evenly was the highest prioritised of the three typologies, except for 2012.

The allocated aid per typology is interesting and perhaps the most significant way to measure the priority of each of the typologies, but analysing the amount of projects per typology can also reveal interesting observations.




Chart 1

This distribution is quite different from the allocated aid. By far, the largest amount of projects was related to society-building. As much as 71 % of the projects were related to society-building, while 21 % of the projects were related to nation-building, and only 9 % of the projects were related to state-building. Hence, all the typologies were prioritized differently with regard to the amount of projects per typology. This means that each society-building project received less money per project than nation-building and state-building projects. The reason for this is that society-building is aimed at the civil society and smaller societal groups, which means that there is a need for more projects than for nation-building or state-building. Society-building projects are of smaller scale, and each project costs less to fund, which means that there are more projects that can be funded. The consequence is that the average amount of money spent per project is significantly lower than for nation-building and state-building.

Average money spent on each project (million USD)

	State-building	Nation-building	Society-building
Funding	89	53	7

Table 4

As shown in Table 4, the average money spent on society-building projects was \$ 7 million, which is only 8 % of what was averagely spent per state-building project. When analysing the average spending per project the priority of the typologies yet again seem to differ. The average spending on state-building projects was significantly larger than both nation-building and society-building projects. Furthermore, nation-building projects were on average significantly larger than society-building projects. The average spending per project for the typologies supports the argument that society-building projects are smaller in size, making it possible to fund more projects for less money in total than for nation-building and state-building. The problem with using the average spending as a tool for the analysis is that it does not control for extreme observations and for that reason it is also interesting to look at the median amount of money spent per project for the three typologies.

Median money spent on each project (million USD)

	State-building	Nation-building	Society-building
Funding	0,29682	5,35236	0,21969

Table 5

The median amount of money spent per project is quite different from the average money spent per project, as depicted in Table 5. The most obvious difference is that state-building projects' median spending was significantly lower than expected, considering the large average spending. The difference between the median spending on state-building and society-building is as low as about 3:4, whereas the median for state-building was highest. This emphasises the importance of controlling for extreme observations and implies that there were a few state-building projects that received far more money than the average project. The relation between the average and the median spending per state-building project is as large as 2:601. This is also true for society-building, but the difference between the median and average spending per project is significantly lower (2:67) than for the case of state-building. When it comes to nation-building, the median spending per project is also significantly lower than the average spending per project, but the relation between the average and median spending is about 1:10. This implies that there are some nation-building projects receiving much more funding than the average project. Because the nation-building projects received most total funding, and because of the ratio between the median and the average spending on

nation-building projects, it also implies that the nation-building projects on average were larger than both state-building and nation-building projects.

2.6 The relation between the extending agencies and aid recipients by category

By looking at the amount of projects and aid given to each of the typologies in relation to the different agencies and the typologies, it is possible to go deeper into the discussion about which of the typologies the U.S. government related to when contributing with aid to Afghanistan.

2.6.1 State-building

Total, median and average aid from agency for state-building (million USD)

Extending agency	Total	Median	Average
U.S. Agency for International Development	1771,46155	3,083335	0,43853
Department of State	1640,10638	3,33891	126,1620292
Department of Defense	1071,25452	175,64896	214,252572
Department of the Army	59,36062	29,68031	29,68031
Department of Justice	4,57084	0,04458	0,2856775
Department of the Treasury	1,31559	0,2954	0,43853
Department of Homeland Security	0,08527	0,01956	0,0213175
Department of Agriculture	0,00834	0,00834	0,00834
Department of Commerce	0	0	0
Department of Health and Human Services	0	0	0
Department of Labor	0	0	0
Department of Transportation	0	0	0

Table 6

As seen in Table 6 above, there are large variations in how much money the different extending agencies spent on state-building, and in how much average or median money was spent per project as well. First of all there, are four agencies that did not contributed to any of the state-building projects. Department of Labor and Department of commerce are preoccupied with economic cases and thereby it is natural that they did not contributed to

state-building projects. Department of Transportation only contributed with one project during the time-period examined, which was a nation-building project as transportation is infrastructure.⁹⁶ Department of Health and Human Services are naturally related to society-building projects because they do work with health and human services, and not building a state apparatus and enabling them to attain a monopoly on force. These four extending agencies will therefore not be discussed further in relation to state-building projects.

There are several observations to point out for the distribution presented in Table 6. Firstly, both USAID and Department of State each contributed with about one third of the total amount of state-building aid, while the Department of Defense contributed with about one quarter of the total amount of aid for state-building. Thus, these three extending agencies by far had the largest impact on how the American effort to do state-building work in Afghanistan was shaped. Because many of the state-building projects were related to the training of Afghan personnel, with the purpose to give them the ability to enforce laws, it is not surprising that the Department of Defense in a large extent was involved with state-building efforts. The state-building projects related to the building of a state apparatus is not surprisingly involving the Department of State is, but they are also connected to the ability to enforce laws. USAID is the government organisation for developmental aid and is the agency that contributed the most in total, but also per typology.

Although the total sums may give answers to which extending agency was most involved, it is not an accurate measurement regarding the involvement and dedication to each state-building project. When analysing Table 6 one can immediately observe that USAID had a rather low average spending per state-building project, while the median spending was somewhat bigger. At slightly more than \$ 3 million median spending per project, USAID and the Department of State seem to have been equally committed to the state-building projects. The Department of Defense, on the other hand, must have been said to be committed in a greater extend, with a median contribution of more than \$ 175 million per state-building project, making it the agency with the highest median contribution. The Department of the Army's total contribution was just above \$ 59 million, while the median contribution was almost \$ 30 million per state-building project. This implies that the Department of the Army did not contribute with aid for many state-building projects, but it also implies that when it did contribute it was with a large commitment.

⁹⁶ A complete listing of the projects, divided per typology, can be found in the appendix.

2.6.2 Nation-building

Total, median and average aid from agency for nation-building (million USD)

Extending agency	Total	Median	Average
U.S. Agency for International Development	4613,72158	12,37651	83,88584691
Department of the Army	1330,62396	7,97463	88,708264
Department of Defense	333,21014	33,94713	7,401323077
Department of Agriculture	96,2172	1,84943	7,401323077
Department of Transportation	8,11288	8,11288	8,11288
Department of the Treasury	7,74679	0,31488	0,455693529
Department of Labor	1,75	0,6	0,583333333
Department of State	0,88116	0,046945	0,088116
Department of Commerce	0	0	0
Department of Health and Human Services	0	0	0
Department of Homeland Security	0	0	0
Department of Justice	0	0	0

Table 7

Nation-building projects also lacked support from some of the extending agencies.

Department of Commerce is mostly related to economy, and while some of the economic projects were related to nation-building that was not the case for the Department of Commerce. Department of Health and Human Services, as previously stated, do humanitarian work and their aid projects will fall under the society-building category. Department of Homeland Security contributes with aid for projects that are related to security and law enforcement, hence they are not related to nation-building, as is also the case for the Department of Justice.

USAID was the agency that contributed with most aid for nation-building projects, 72 % of the total amount for nation-building aid. The Department of the Army was second to largest, while the Department of Defense was third to largest on the descending list with 21 % and 5 % of the total amount of aid for nation-building. Department of Defense contributed with the most aid per project according to the median distribution, meaning they were more economically committed to each project than USAID. USAID on the other hand, contributed second to most according to the median distribution also implying a commitment to the nation-building projects they supported.

When comparing median and average distribution of aid per project, especially for USAID and the Department of the Army, it is noticeable that there are a few extreme observations that received more aid than the average project. This indicates that some of the nation-building projects were particularly costly or large in magnitude. This does not necessarily mean that USAID or the Department of the Army were more committed to nation-building instead of state-building or society-building, but rather that in order to be able to complete the largest projects it was necessary to invest large sums. Infrastructure is an example of costly projects that demands vast amounts of money, thereby partly explaining the extreme observations.

2.6.3 Society-building

Total, median and average aid from agency for society-building (million USD)

Extending agency	Total	Median	Average
U.S. Agency for International Development	2390,69523	1,5983	20,97101079
Department of State	217,17131	0,102	1,820927368
Department of the Army	159,65973	6,247285	19,95746625
Department of Agriculture	123,87817	8,24506	20,64636167
Department of Defense	108,51653	10,14923	21,703306
Department of Health and Human Services	34,59762	0,12077	1,820927368
Department of Commerce	0	0	0
Department of Homeland Security	0	0	0
Department of Justice	0	0	0
Department of Labor	0	0	0
Department of the Treasury	0	0	0
Department of Transportation	0	0	0

Table 8

As in the case of state-building and nation-building, society-building projects also lacked support from some of the extending agencies. Department of Commerce and Department of the Treasury are as previously stated preoccupied with economics and thereby fall outside of society-building criteria. Department of Homeland Security is preoccupied with state-building, which is also true for Department of Justice. Department of Labor does not contribute with aid that is aimed at the civil society. Department of Transportation had, as

previously stated, only one project in Afghanistan from 2007 to 2012 that was for transportation, which is infrastructure, and is a criteria for nation-building.

USAID contributed with most aid in total for society-building as well, and was far ahead of Department of State, which contributed with second to most in total. At the same time, Department of State contributed with aid for 63 % of the total amount of society-building projects, meaning they invested in far more projects than any of the other extending agencies. USAID contributed with aid for 28 % of the total amount of society-building projects, which is a lot of the projects, but still far less than Department of State. This implies that because of the nature of society-building projects, Department of State can be said to have contributed the most because they were able to reach out to more people through the amount of projects they contributed aid for.

The difference between average and median contribution per project reveals differences in the project budget size also for society-building, although these differences are smaller than for nation- and state-building projects. The reason for this is arguably the nature of society-building projects being characterized by smaller budgets, which means that the total amount of projects may be larger than for nation- and state-building projects without spending as much money.

Department of Defense contributed with the largest amount of aid with regard to median contribution per society-building project, which implies that they were contributing with significant sums for the 1 % of the total amount of projects they contributed for. Department of State's median contribution per project was the lowest of all the median contributions, underlining that the society-building projects may have quite small budgets. As noted, for society-building this does not necessarily mean anything about the commitment of the agency, and it is still arguably explained by how the Department of State was the agency with the largest impact on society-building.

2.7 Comparing aid recipients by type

The comparison will be done in three steps: First, there will be a comparison of the distribution among the extending agencies per type, second there will be a discussion of the purpose of the different aid projects as well as a discussion on the relevance of their size and scope, before moving on to a comparison of the total amount of aid allocated to each category. Finally there will be a conclusion, explaining what typology the U.S. government is most dedicated to.

2.7.1 Comparing the distribution of aid per extending agency

The extending agency that contributed with most aid to Afghanistan (2007-2012) was USAID, which is not surprising considering it is the U.S. Agency for International Development. What is more surprising is that the amount of aid contributed by Department of Defense and Department of the Army. They both contributed to a moderate amount of projects, but the median contribution was mostly the largest for all the typologies, which made them important for the American aid effort, independent of typology.

State-building

When reviewing the numbers for state-building, it is evident that USAID provided the most amount of aid in total, and also funded the largest state-building project. This fact explains why USAID allocated the most aid for state-building projects because it was of a considerable size. Thus, USAID was a vital part of state-building, particularly for the building of the state apparatus and their ability to govern. The USAID-funded state-building projects were mainly aimed at governance and the building of the state apparatus, meaning they did not contribute in any significant degree to the ability to monopolize force. That is an interesting observation as it implies that USAID does not involve itself with violence, police work, or similar aspects of foreign aid, but stays true to its purpose of promoting peace, democracy and stability.

Department of Defense and Department of the Army contributed for some of the largest state-building projects with regard to the economic size. This explains their median contribution for state-building projects as they only contributed to respectively four and two projects each. State-building is a process that requires funding of projects that is more in line with the work of these two departments, referring to the monopolization of force particularly. Because of this, the projects that the two departments contributed to were mostly concerned with security, counter-narcotics and the rule of law. The importance of this is of a great matter when it comes to state-building, thereby the DoD and the DA are vital agencies for the possibility to succeed with state-building.

The Department of State funded the second to largest state-building project from 2007 to 2012, but also some of the smaller projects, which explains the median contribution per project (3,33891). That particular project accounts for almost the entire contribution from the

DoS to state-building, meaning that it was an important agency for that particular project, but not as important for the overall state-building effort.

Nation-building

When reviewing the nation-building projects, it is evident that USAID was the definitive largest contributor for the total amount of aid, but also when looking at the median contribution per project. USAID's foreign aid work is in many ways aimed at doing nation-building work particularly building of infrastructure, democratic institutions (recognizing the citizens), as well as building the economy as part of a strategy to build a nation. USAID also contributes to conflict mitigation, which is a vital part of nation-building as it makes it possible to construct a national identity. Because of this, and the fact that USAID funded the most nation-building projects, it should be agreeable that it was the most important agency for the nation-building process.

The DoD contributed to quite large nation-building projects, as well as to a moderate amount of the projects, explaining the high median contribution per project. Although it was an important agency, the aid was mostly aimed at infrastructure projects, meaning it did work that enable to construct a national identity and give citizens a possibility to participate in the democratic process, but it is not the most important agency. Because it did not participate in the entire process and only contributed to a handful of projects, the DoD was more important to the specific projects it funded, rather than the entire nation-building effort. This was also the case for the DA as it contributed mostly for infrastructure and transportation. It funded more projects than the DoD, some smaller ones explaining the lower median contribution per project, but because the nature of the projects was mostly for infrastructure the DA had the same profile as the DoD.

Society-building

USAID was also the agency that contributed with the most aid in total for society-building, but with funding 28 % of the total amount of society-building projects, the median contribution per project was rather low. USAID funded the eight largest society-building projects, but also many smaller projects ending in the low median contribution. Nevertheless, USAID was an important agency for the society-building process in Afghanistan because of the large amount of aid in total, but also for funding many diverse projects. The DoD, DA and USDA were also important contributors for the society-building projects because they funded large projects. Because of that they were more important for those specific projects

than the entire society-building process, but none of these agencies were the most important for the society-building process.

The DoS funded 63 % of the society-building projects from 2007 to 2012. It spent second to most in total on these projects, but had a very low median contribution per project. As previously discussed the size of society-building projects are not as large as for nation- or state-building projects. Society-building is more dependent on reaching out to as many people as possible, not to fund the largest projects in Afghanistan, only benefiting the state apparatus. The amount of low cost society-building projects may do great difference for the people receiving the aid and for the entire Afghan civic society. Therefore it is arguably the DoS that was the most important agency for the American society-building efforts in Afghanistan from 2007 to 2012. This is also because the DoS is the U.S. executive power of foreign policy and diplomatic issues, meaning they were possibly trying to establish a good relationship between the USA and the Afghan citizens.

Conclusion

When summing up the different agencies' efforts it becomes evident that there are differences in their importance for each of the typologies. The state-building efforts were in largest extent made possible by the DoD and the DA, meaning they were vital agencies for the state-building efforts, but they were not as important for the entire process of nation-building or society-building. For those two typologies they were more important for the specific projects they funded rather the entire process. When reviewing the nation-building efforts it is evident that USAID seems to have been the most important agency both because of its mission, and because of the extent of the contributions it made. The DoS seems to have been the most important agency for society-building. It is unfeasible to claim that one specific agency was the most important agency for the entire U.S. aid effort in Afghanistan from 2007 to 2012, because the different agencies seem to exercise different level of influence, and thereby also different level of importance both for the different typologies, and for the total allocated aid variable.

2.7.2 Comparison of the projects' purpose and the difference between small and large projects

Reviewing the projects may enable a discussion and conclusion whether the size and purpose of the projects has something to do with the division among the typologies, and if some

projects seem more important than others. This is reviewed per typology before concluding on the matter.

Amount of projects per typology by total economic size (million USD)
(2007-2012)

	State-building	Nation-building	Society-building
> \$ 100	6	15	7
\$ 50 - \$ 99	0	7	9
\$ 10 - \$ 49	6	24	26
< \$ 10	39	75	372
	51	121	414

Table 9

State-building

A predominant number of the state-building projects received less than \$ 10 million (76 % of the state-building projects), while only six of the projects received more than \$ 100 million. Although there is a difference in the amount of money given to the projects, there are similar purposes for each of them. Mainly there have been given aid for counter narcotic work, weapon destruction, enabling the executive function of the state, and training of Afghan personnel in order to enable them to enforce laws. The larger projects seem to have been more broadly based aid, while smaller projects may have been aimed more locally. This implies that the large projects were important because of the amount of money being donated, rather than the specific purpose intended for them. Thereby size does not matter significantly for state-building projects, as every project serve similar purposes in support for a collective state-building effort.

Nation-building

The distribution of aid among the nation-building projects was more diverse than for the state-building projects. 15 projects received more than \$ 100 million, 7 received between \$ 100 million and \$ 50 million, 24 projects received between \$ 10 million and \$ 50 million, while 75 projects received less than \$ 10 million. The smallest projects had the purpose of

being technical assistance in different matters, while the medium sized projects went to water and sanitation, education, and electricity. The largest projects' purpose was transportation, economic growth, conflict mitigation, and general reconstruction. In other words there were different purpose according to the size of the projects. That does not necessarily indicate a difference in importance, but rather that the largest projects were more costly and more broadly based than the smaller projects. Thus, the nation-building projects differed in size, but as with the state-building projects this does not indicate that it affects the division of the projects into the three typologies.

Percentages of Table 9

	State-building	Nation-building	Society-building
> \$ 100	12 %	12 %	2 %
\$ 50 - \$ 99	0 %	6 %	2 %
\$ 10 - \$ 49	12 %	20 %	6 %
< \$ 10	76 %	62 %	90 %

Table 10

Society-building

The society-building projects mainly received less than \$ 10 million (372 of the projects or 90 % of the society-building projects), while some received between \$ 10 and \$ 100 million (35 projects), and just 7 projects received more than \$ 100 million (2 % of the society-building projects). The projects were mostly similar in purpose, whether it was for food aid, women's rights, health services, or victims' assistance. Thus, the projects' purposes thus do not differ in importance, as is also the case for state- and nation-building. Society-building projects do differ from state- and nation-building projects on one matter, which is the relationship between the size of the project and the relation to the typology. The high frequency of society-building projects that are small in size, provides appropriate evidence that small projects tend to be society-building, rather than nation- or state-building projects.

Conclusion

The size of the projects seem to have one effect on the division among the typologies, which is that the smaller the projects are, the greater the probability is that they are society-building projects. It is not a mutually exclusively observation, but the probability increases according

to how small the amount of funding for the project is. When it comes to the purposes of the projects, this will off course have an effect on the division on which typology they will be divided into, but the purposes of the projects within the different typologies do not seem to have any relation to the amount of money funded, or the size of the projects, except for some projects demanding more funding than others in order to accomplish the purposes (such as costly projects with the purpose of building infrastructure).

2.7.3 Comparing the total spending and amount of projects per typology

Comparing the total amount of aid spent per does not reveal an exclusive conclusion to begin with. Nation-building, which received 46 % of the total allocated aid (2007-2012), can be claimed to be the U.S. government's highest prioritized goal, followed by state-building (33%), and finally nation-building (22 %). But, this changes when considering the distribution of projects per typology. 71 % of the projects were society-building projects, thereby in this sense society-building arguably was what the U.S. government related the most to as well. The only typology that does not have the highest priority regarding projects or money is state-building, but at the same time this typology received second to most money. The point is that it is difficult to conclude on the background of total sums. Considering that society-building projects tend to have smaller budgets than state- or nation-building projects, it costs less to do society-building. The effect is that the impact of the society-building projects on the civic society is perhaps as big as state-building projects are on the state. Therefore the U.S. government's society-building efforts can be considered to be just as important as the state-building efforts.

What may separate the prioritisation of the typologies is the size of certain projects. Some projects with very big budgets may outperform the total budget. Below is a distribution of the five projects that received the largest amount of money in total from 2007 to 2012, for each of the three typologies (Table 9). As is visible in the table, state-building was the typology with the two largest projects, whereby one was for the executive function of the public sector, while the other was for counter narcotics and law enforcement. Both these kinds of projects operate at the core of the conditions for state-building and represent the largest focus of the state-building projects. The remaining three state-building projects on the top five list were smaller in economic size, whereby the fifth project was just 1/10 of the largest project. This indicates that there were several smaller state-building projects as well, but the large, more general projects were prioritised when it comes to giving to state-

building. The top five state-building projects accounted for 93 % of the total aid for state-building projects, further highlighting that state-building projects were few, but large in size.

The five largest nation-building projects were not as big as the two largest state-building projects, but the money was more evenly distributed per project than for state-building. This is consistent with the idea of nation-building projects being large in size, as it is for such measures as infrastructure, which are costly and time-consuming, meaning there is a need for large amounts of money. There were three kinds of projects within the top five: Infrastructure projects, economic growth projects and conflict mitigation projects. The first two kinds are both related to the practical preconditions necessary for nation-building, while the final group is vital for the creation of a national identity. Thus, the top five nation-building projects are good representations of the entire nation-building effort. The top five projects accounted for 56 % of the total nation-building aid effort, thereby underlining that nation-building projects are quite evenly large in size.

Top five projects per typology (million USD)

State-building		Nation-building		Society-building	
Project name	Money spent	Project name	Money spent	Project name	Money spent
Public Sector Executive Function	1734,70073	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Transportation	849,09953	Local Government and Decentralization	409,68321
International Narcotics & Law Enforcement: Country Program	1418,6363	Transport Services	821,66725	Agricultural Sector Productivity	350,21656
In-Country Counternarcotics Program	706,758	Modern Energy Services	697,45275	Maternal and Child Health	258,83083
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA): Special Overseas Contingency Operations funding authority to support TFBSO Programs	203,25661	Economic Growth and Development	694,99133	Commodity Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Other Emergency	158,5844
International Narcotics & Law Enforcement: Anti-Crime Programs	177,21613	Conflict Mitigation	493,64397	Crisis Assistance and Recovery	153,43255
Total	4240,56777	Total	3556,85483	Total	1330,74755

Table 11

The five largest society-building projects were significantly smaller than the state- and nation-building projects, but as previously discussed, society-building projects are much smaller on an economic scale. At the same time, the top five projects accounted for 44 % of the total amount of aid allocated for society-building efforts. This means that the top five projects were quite large when comparing them to the rest of the society-building projects. The amount of money spent on each of the top five society-building projects was relatively evenly distributed, which fits well with the idea of society-building projects.

The conclusion is that the U.S. government did nation-building, state-building and society-building when contributing with developmental aid to Afghanistan from 2007 to 2012, thereby confirming H4⁹⁷. Although, when reviewing the distribution of aid for the different typologies per year, it becomes clear that the priority shifted somewhat from year to year. Graph 2 shows that nation-building was the most prioritized typology from 2007 to 2011, which may confirm H2⁹⁸. From 2011 to 2012 circumstances changed and both nation-building and society-building decreased, while state-building increased, leaving state-building clearly on top and partly confirming H1⁹⁹. The shift in priority implies that the U.S. government's aid efforts in Afghanistan were dependent on the situation in Afghanistan. After 2011 it became clear that the U.S. troops would return to the U.S. within a short time period, meaning that the American aid effort had to be rushed. State-building is a less time consuming process than nation-building, which may explain the shift in priority. Society-building, on the other hand, was (except from 2011) the typology with the lowest priority. As discussed earlier, the amount of aid per project separates society-building from state- and nation-building, but the purposes of society-building are also different from nation- and state-building. Society-building has a purpose of building and aiding the civic society, but not the state itself, while state- and nation-building are both preoccupied with building a state apparatus. Society-building is also the typology that is possible to maintain with a lower level of cost over time, because of the nature of the projects' size and need of funding. This means that society-building can be continued in the same manner as before because it always aids some projects even though the budget level is low, while nation- and state-building projects need a larger budget. Including the amount of society-building projects from 2007-2012, it is also possible to partly confirm H3¹⁰⁰. Because of this, there are no grounds for claiming that H1-3 are confirmed, thereby H4 must be the conclusion.

2.8 Conclusion

Considering the elaborated evidence and observations above, it is difficult to conclude on one single note. The overall implications are that the U.S. government in largest extent did nation-building when contribution with aid to Afghanistan from 2007 to 2012. At the same time the effect of the low cost society-building projects may have reached further than the

⁹⁷ The American government's aid effort in Afghanistan (2007-2012) was related to state-building, nation-building, and society-building.

⁹⁸ The American government's aid effort in Afghanistan (2007-2012) was related to nation-building.

⁹⁹ The American government's aid effort in Afghanistan (2007-2012) was related to state-building.

¹⁰⁰ The American government's aid effort in Afghanistan (2007-2012) was related to society-building.

expensive nation-building projects. Analysing the changes in priority between the three typologies from year to year also provides divergent evidence for the main priority of the different typologies. In essence, all of these observations must end in the conclusion that H4 is proved regarding the overall aid efforts analysed. The changing priority may show a trend for the time period after 2012, where state-building had the highest priority, but this will only end in speculations. Nation-building was a vital part of the U.S. aid efforts, but it is time-consuming and thereby it is not surprising that its priority fell towards the end of the U.S. military operation in Afghanistan. After these considerations hypothesis H1, H2 and H3 are then rejected and hypothesis H4 is confirmed, which means that the U.S. aid efforts in Afghanistan were a combination of state-building, nation-building, and society-building.

3 Foreign policy traditions, foreign policy towards Afghanistan, U.S. Afghan aid, and American interests

The connection between foreign policy traditions, foreign policy goals and the U.S. aid efforts in Afghanistan are implied, but not yet revealed within this thesis. This final chapter will discuss these connections. The chapter consists of four parts: A presentation of U.S. foreign policy goals in Afghanistan for the years 2007-2012; a comparison of American foreign policy goals in Afghanistan for 2007-2012 and the results presented in chapter 2; reflections on the development from nation-building towards state-building efforts in Afghanistan and its relation to American policy towards Afghanistan; a short discussion of American interests in Afghanistan; reflections on American foreign policy traditions and the observations made in chapter 2.

3.1 U.S. foreign policy goals in Afghanistan (2007-2012)

In order to enable a complete discussion on American foreign policy, foreign aid, and what types of development is central for the American government, it is necessary to review the U.S. foreign policy goals in Afghanistan during the years analysed in this thesis (2007-2012). American foreign policy and strategies are rarely concretely pronounced to the public and must in some degree be interpreted in order to be understood. The U.S. Embassy in Brussels has released a series of dossiers that are supposed to "... highlight the priorities of the US Government with regard to specific foreign policy policy [sic] issues ... [by providing] statements by U.S. public officials, but also reports, hearings, and journal articles."¹⁰¹ Thus, the source of American foreign policy goals in Afghanistan cannot be found in a concrete description of such policy, but must be inferred from general statements of foreign policy and other relevant documents. Therefore, the following explanation of U.S. foreign policy goals in Afghanistan is based on information and perspectives gathered from Senate hearings, CRS Congressional reports, and statements issued by presidents Obama and Karzai.

¹⁰¹ Embassy of the United States, "Afghanistan - United States Policy toward Afghanistan & Pakistan: A Dossier," <http://www.uspolicy.be/dossier/afghanistan-united-states-policy-toward-afghanistan-pakistan-dossier>.

The empirical evidence of this thesis is deduced from the analysis of U.S. foreign aid work in Afghanistan, but there was also a large military effort in Afghanistan. This effort, particularly focusing on security, is an aspect that will be discussed in some degree when reviewing the American foreign policy goals in Afghanistan. Because it is not part of the quantitative analysis it will not be taken into consideration in the same depth as the civic aid work. This is a limitation for this thesis, but considering the frame of the thesis work, it does not impair the quality of the discussion. It is important to note that civilian aid funded by military agencies fall within the scope of the research in this thesis, such as the Commander's Emergency Response Program. The military effort is seen as part of the state-building process because it enables monopolization of violence as well as enforcement of laws.

According to Kenneth Katzman, the Bush Administration decided it was necessary to launch a nation-building project rather than leaving the area devastated as a result of the U.S. lead military operations in 2001.¹⁰² This appears to have become a continuing policy, but not during the first years after the initial attack on Afghanistan. As the intervention in Bosnia left it dependent on aid, which it partly still is today, the Bush Administrations wanted to avoid a similar long-term commitment in Afghanistan to begin with, according to James Dobbins.¹⁰³ But, as Dobbins points out, a low level of commitment gives a low degree of results, and by 2004 there was a shift in policy whereby the contribution of both military and civilian aid increased drastically. Richard A. Boucher¹⁰⁴ pointed out that by 2007 the rebuilding of Afghanistan as a democratic nation was not finished and that there was a need to increase the nation building activities.¹⁰⁵ According to Boucher, the strategy of the Bush Administration intertwined security, governance and reconstruction. Reconstruction was important in order to stabilise Afghanistan by connecting the country via building roads, but also by building electrical plants and through training government officials, as well as police forces.¹⁰⁶ There was also a large focus on governance and law enforcement. These aspects of the Bush Administration's Afghan policy were also relevant in 2008. Additionally were counter-narcotic efforts necessary to increase food production, deal with the insurgents and impose law and order (noted by David T. Johnson, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law

¹⁰² Kenneth Katzman, "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy," (Embassy of the United States website: U.S. Congress, 2012), 9.

¹⁰³ United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Afghanistan: Time for a New Strategy?*, 110th Congress, March 8, 2007.

¹⁰⁴ Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs 2006-2009.

¹⁰⁵ *Afghanistan: Time for a New Strategy?*

¹⁰⁶ *Afghanistan: Time for a New Strategy?*

Enforcement Affairs).¹⁰⁷ The goal in 2008 was still, as noted by Boucher, to "... defeat the insurgency and return Afghanistan to long-term stability based on Afghan national sovereignty, democratic principles, and respect for human rights."¹⁰⁸ This hints at a still on going process of nation building to a much larger extent than initially intended.

After Barack Obama won the election and was inaugurated as president in 2009, Katzman noted a difference in policy towards Afghanistan: "The Obama Administration's strategy review in late 2009 narrowed official U.S. goals to preventing terrorism safe haven in Afghanistan and Pakistan."¹⁰⁹ At the same time, Katzman claims that the Obama Administration continued the nation-building policy, and in some aspects might have even expanded it: "No matter how expansively the U.S. mission has been defined, building the capacity of and reforming Afghan governance— particularly reducing governmental corruption—have been consistently and widely judged to be key to the success of U.S. policy."¹¹⁰ Thus, the narrowing of the foreign policy goals made by the Obama Administration had to be an expansion of the policy goals in Afghanistan. But, other's opinions, such as Rory Stewart¹¹¹, claimed that the Obama Administration narrowed its focus only to counter-terrorism, which he related to state-building.¹¹² Furthermore, Stewart argued that the strategy was likely to fail, based on a belief that the state had to be built by an Afghan national movement, and not by foreign states. His reasoning for this was that the Afghan society is spread over a vast and rough area with strong traditions of local self-governance. If Afghanistan was to be built by an Afghan national movement, the use of nation-building would be more effective than the use of state-building, because one of its attributes focuses on the creation of a national identity, which is arguably necessary for the creation of a national Afghan movement. Senator John Kerry also shared the perception of a narrowed policy in which he claimed that it was not an open-ended nation building exercise.¹¹³

In 2009 President Obama decided to increase the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan in order to break the insurgents' momentum, as a prelude to withdrawal.¹¹⁴ The

¹⁰⁷ United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Afghanistan: A Plan to Turn the Tide?*, 110th Congress, January 31, 2008.

¹⁰⁸ *Afghanistan: A Plan to Turn the Tide?*

¹⁰⁹ Katzman, "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy," 9.

¹¹⁰ "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy," 9.

¹¹¹ Professor and Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy.

¹¹² United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Exploring Three Strategies for Afghanistan*, 111th Congress, September 16, 2009.

¹¹³ United States Senate Committee for Foreign Relations, *Afghanistan: Assessing the Road Ahead*, 111th Congress, December 3 2009.

¹¹⁴ United States Senate Committee for Foreign Relations, *The New Afghanistan Strategy: The View from the Ground*, 111th Congress, December 9, 2009.

reoccurring phrase in many of the hearings, after the Obama Administration took charge of the foreign policy towards Afghanistan, was that Afghanistan should not become a safe-haven for terrorists. Richard Holbrooke¹¹⁵ claimed the importance of security as a prerequisite for everything else, thereby further underlining the shift in policy towards counter-terrorism, and less focus on a nation building effort.¹¹⁶ The focus was also to create stable governments that could withstand Al-Qaeda and Taliban. Francis J. West concluded in 2011 that the U.S. was past a mission of nation building and had to shift focus to prevent safe-havens for terrorists. This position correlates with Katzman's arguments on the shift in the Obama Administration policy.¹¹⁷

At the same time as the Obama Administration shifted the policy focus from nation-building to security in 2009, then Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, in a hearing in 2011, elaborated on the Obama Administrations foreign policy at that point in time: Clinton explained that the current Obama Administration policy goals in Afghanistan focused on expansion of civilian support, to give Afghans a stake in their country's future and provide alternatives to extremism and insurgency, a larger focus on tribal councils, as well as a shift from short term to long term stabilisation.¹¹⁸ This indicates that there were conflicting policy goals within the Obama Administration, but also underlines that the Obama Administration still continued the nation-building work, even though there was an increased focus on security. On the other hand, several Senate and House hearings revealed (in 2011) that many government officials, as well as non-government advisors were more preoccupied with Pakistan than Afghanistan. The increased focus on Pakistan, and the pressure for a shift in focus being put on the administration was arguably the reason for the increased focus on security and state-building efforts in Afghanistan, which could enable a faster retraction of troops. In addition, a faster retraction of troops and funding from Afghanistan would enable a focus on economic issues at home, as well as a larger engagement with Pakistan. This would undoubtedly collide with the Obama Administration's goal of stabilising Afghanistan in a long-term perspective, because that would demand a long-term U.S. commitment. All these differing aspects indicate that the Obama Administration's policy goals in Afghanistan were conflicting and lacked a shared focus, meaning that the strategy for the implementation of the aid work also could be conflicting.

¹¹⁵ Department of State, Special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

¹¹⁶ United States Senate Committee for Foreign Relations, *Afghanistan: Governance and the Civilian Strategy*, 111th Congress, July 14, 2010.

¹¹⁷ Armed Services Committee, *The Way Ahead in Afghanistan*, 112th Congress, July 27, 2011.

¹¹⁸ United States Senate Committee for Foreign Relations, *Evaluating Goals and Progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan*, 112th Congress, June 23, 2011.

In 2013 Obama and Karzai released a joint statement summarising some of the policy goals that would be sought after the withdrawal of American troops. Among these policy goals were the continued work to enable Afghan security forces to take over the security responsibility in Afghanistan, continue growth and stabilisation of the Afghan economy, and continue peace meetings between tribal societies.¹¹⁹

A major part of the U.S. policy towards Afghanistan in general was, and is, the provision of security for Afghan citizens. Because this was a military effort it will just be taken into consideration, because the thesis main focus lies on civic aid. Providing security and training Afghan personnel to take charge, as foreign soldiers return to their respective states, was an important aspect of the American foreign policy goals. It is also an important aspect for the civic aid work because some degree of security is a necessity for aid workers. If there is no security it is very difficult, sometimes impossible, to do any work in the field. Hence, the American military effort is seen in context of the state-building process. Nation- and society-building can be used to broaden the state-building effort. The American military presence does not necessarily correlate with the civilian efforts, but considerations are made because of the connection to state-building.

3.2 Comparison of American foreign policy goals and the results of the quantitative analysis

Comparing the American policy goals in Afghanistan (as presented above) and the results of the quantitative analysis will reveal if the U.S. government was consistent in the implementation of aid, which was supposed to realise the presented policy goals. First and foremost it is important to point out that the American foreign policy towards Afghanistan (2007-2012) does not set specific goals that can be pertained to the individual projects. The overall goals however, can be pertained to the observations regarding the typologies and the reasoning behind the definition of each typology, because the foreign policy goals presented in part 3.1 are characterized by setting general goals for the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan.

The initial military operations in Afghanistan did not presuppose a long-term commitment, as the Bush administration wanted to make less of an impact in Afghanistan to begin with. It did not take long before decision-makers realised it was necessary to change attitude towards the region not to repeat history (the intervention against the Soviet Union

¹¹⁹ "Joint Statement by President Obama and President Karzai," news release, January 11,, 2013, <http://uspolicy.belgium.usembassy.gov/headline/joint-statement-presidents-obama-karzai>.

supported Afghan government in the 1980s), meaning to leave Afghanistan un-aided after dismantling its Taliban government. Although the data analysed in chapter 2 are from after the shift in policy in 2004, it is clear that the total amount of American aid being given to Afghanistan increased from 2007-2009, while stabilising at a high level from 2009-2012. This proves that the policy of aiding Afghan society and state was fulfilled for the years researched. It also proves that after the Obama Administration took charge of the policy towards Afghanistan there was an increase of aid, as well as a stabilisation at high levels of aid expenditures. In addition to this, Boucher's solicitation for a need to increase the nation building activities in 2007 seems to have had an impact because of the overall increase in aid, but also because of an increase in the aid directed at the nation-building typology, and because several projects were supposed to do reconstruction.

Boucher also pointed out in 2007 that reconstruction was an important factor in stabilising Afghanistan, which correlates with the theory of nation-building. As the allocated aid for nation-building projects increased from 2007-2009 it arguably proves that there was a commitment to nation-building efforts, also because it was the typology that had the highest priority according to the aid expenditures.

The focus of the American policy to base the Afghanistan state on democratic principles, hinting at shaping it like a Western state, is not an easy task to prove by reference to specific projects. The reason for this is that there are extremely few projects that are described as having the purpose of building democracy. The American aid efforts clearly show traits of trying to provide infrastructure, mitigating conflict between tribal societies in order to create peace, and building an executive sector in Afghanistan. This shows an intention of creating a stable democratic state, but as the American policy can be based on some sort of ideology it is difficult to specifically prove that they tried, or were able, to create a democracy. There were projects related to creating a societal commitment among the Afghan citizens, but these projects lacked the description on how and why to do this. Thus it is not possible to conclude that the American aid efforts correlate with that particular policy goal.

The Obama Administration's narrowing of the policy goals in Afghanistan, to prevent terrorist safe haven in Afghanistan or Pakistan, also cannot be specifically confirmed by the observations made in chapter 2. The reason for this is partly because that policy goal presupposed the use of military aid, but also because it is such a broad goal that is difficult to prove when using rather specific project descriptions. What can be confirmed in relation to the narrowing of the policy goal is Katzman's claim that the Obama Administration expanded

the nation building policy. The total amount of aid, as stated earlier, increased after the Obama Administration took charge of the Afghan policy. In addition, the nation-building efforts increased in total, while the state-building efforts decreased in priority (2010) (see Graph 2). This then indicates a focus on creating a stable state by encouraging the Afghan people to agree upon a national identity, whereby especially building infrastructure in order to enable better communication, a vital nation-building tool, was being used.

In 2011 Clinton clarified that the Obama Administration's policy towards Afghanistan emphasised the importance of expanding civilian support. Clinton did not clarify the term further, but if it is to be interpreted as support for civilian society it does correlate with the increase of aid for society-building projects from 2010-2011, confirming a correlation between the policy and the aid efforts. Although this proves some degree of correlation, the following year the aid for society-building projects dropped by almost 40 %, revealing that the civilian support was not as prioritized as Clinton argued in 2011. This may relate to the then upcoming retraction of American troops as also the nation-building projects received less aid in 2012, while state-building projects received more aid in 2012 than any other of the years researched. I see this as related to the apparent shift of priority; the Obama Administration's goal of retraction required a strategy that increased the effort to build a state that could obtain and hold stability. Therefore the focus turned to state-building, because that is a form of development that potentially is less time-consuming.

The American policy goals in Afghanistan from 2007 to 2012 do correlate to some degree with the observations made in chapter 2. Mitigating conflicts, building infrastructure, supporting society-building work, and an increased focus on security are policies/policy goals that correlate with the observations in chapter 2. Although some policy goals correlate with the observations in the quantitative analysis, that is not the case for all the policy goals; the decrease of spending on nation-building and society-building projects does not correlate with the policy goal of long-term stability and building an Afghan society on democratic ideals. The most likely reason for this is the announcement by President Obama of his intention to withdraw a large part of the American forces over several years, transferring the responsibility of security to the Afghan security forces by December 2014. It is obvious that the American government has provided much aid, and has continued to do so as well, but pragmatic reasoning seems to have undermined the policy profile of American aid for Afghanistan. Because of the changing and difficult conditions in Afghanistan, the U.S. government potentially had to alter the policy strategy in order to make it applicable for the changing conditions, or perhaps to enable fulfilment of American interests. On the other

hand, the reassertion of the security dilemma may have decreased the commitment to nation-building, or perhaps there were differing opinions within the Obama Administration, which both can lead to contradictions in regard to policy goals. The withdrawal of troops could be the source of the shift in focus across the three typologies, as the build of the Afghan government had to be more hastily done. State-building may be an effective way of building a state anew, but it is not necessarily a long-term stabilisation as the viability of the state often is non-existent. For long-term stability the use of nation-building theory seems to be a strategy with far more potential, but it is a time-consuming and expensive process, which under the circumstances with domestic economical problems was not a good solution for the American government.

3.3 The shift of priority from nation-building to state-building related to U.S. policy towards Afghanistan

The results of the quantitative analysis in chapter 2 revealed a development in the U.S. priority between the different typologies, in which the most interesting aspect of it was the shift in priority from nation-building aid to state-building aid. The reason for this being an interesting aspect is that those two projects differ in how to strategize building of stability. The nation-building strategy is a costly long-term commitment because it takes time to have citizens in a failed state agree on a national identity. First of all, in Afghanistan in particular, it is necessary to build infrastructure to help transportation and communication in order to give the different tribal societies an opportunity to come together and communicate. The importance of infrastructure is immense, and in a country as poorly developed as Afghanistan this is a large task to take on. After finishing the costly and time-consuming work of building the infrastructure, logically the next phase is to gather tribal communities in order to mitigate conflicts. After conflicts that have been going on for centuries have been resolved in such an extent that it is possible to discuss similarities, the next phase is to get these differing tribal communities to agree upon a common identity; or at least to acknowledge that they have some common interests at a national level, such as peace, freedom to do things their way, and the ability to influence national policies that affects them. Hippler explains (see section 1.6) that the group identities do not necessarily need to be lost, but that the national identity must surpass the different group identities. In order to create a nation it is important that the common identity is imbedded in all groups, otherwise it is difficult to attain stability among the different rural societies, and thereby also national stability. Only when the national

identity surpasses the group identities is this a possibility. The groups can be tribal societies, but also religious groups, women, and other minorities. Tribal societies can be a tougher challenge than other groups as they can be territorial, and many of them in Afghanistan are lead by warlords. This could potentially become a factor that stall the process of creating a national identity, but I will argue that it is still potentially possible as long as there is time to mitigate. The American society consists of groups of different cultural heritage, but at the same time there is a national identity, which is an example of how the national identity may surpass group identities. But there is still room for the group identities as long as the groups conform to the overarching national identity.

As surely can be understood, this process may not even be possible to execute in the first place, but if it is it will take time. If it is possible to gather such conflicting communities on an established idea of a national identity and the idea that they share common interests, it will enable a stable society without severe conflicts. Also, if there is a collective identity that all Afghan citizens can identify themselves with, it will arguably be a unifying point in times of national or international crisis. Also, in the process of accomplishing this, infrastructure has been built, helping the creation of a national economy tying all parts of Afghanistan together, then again contributing to further development. Because of these aspects, nation-building is a time-consuming process, but the outcome of it is potentially long-term stability.

The state-building strategy differs from nation-building in many ways, especially characterized by the possibly rushed effort to put together a minimum state apparatus, which is able to have a scope and strength, as well as to monopolise violence in order to enforce laws. This can be less time-consuming, as building a state apparatus does not mean that the apparatus is the most efficient or the best version of the state, but rather that it is able to perform coercion and a minimum of stability. In Afghanistan, the ability to enforce laws and provide security has for many years been executed by American and allied troops, while spending a lot of time training Afghan military personnel and police forces. This is costly as long as it is an on-going commitment, but as it is such a costly effort for the foreign states contributing in Afghanistan it is not something that can be upheld for a long time, and in December 2014, the security responsibility was transferred to the Afghan forces.

The other aspects of state-building that are part of the research are the building of a minimum of state apparatus and the training of Afghan personnel. These efforts are not particularly time-consuming, nor are they costly in a long-term aspect. As soon as the state apparatus is strong enough to exercise the minimum of control, the goal of state-building in relation to the state apparatus is accomplished. The same can also be said in regard to the

training of Afghan personnel; when they are able to do a minimum of police and security work, having monopolized force and being able to enforce laws, it is not necessary to fund the state-building efforts any more. This presupposes that the state apparently has a source of revenue independent of outside power, and that the security forces are sufficiently trained and motivated. In my opinion it is not necessarily possible to be certain that these prerequisites are in place before retraction, as retraction will be the real test of the ability of the state. There may also be other aspects that influence the foreign state's commitment to the receiving state. Aspects such as the foreign states domestic economy, political priorities, and more critical emergencies other places, may influence the decision to withdraw. If the foreign state's perception is that the minimal state system should be able to support itself and have other incentives to withdraw as well, it is arguably a possibility that the foreign state withdraws to early. An example of this is the American-trained Iraqi army, which did not have the will to fight ISIS in Mosul, Iraq.¹²⁰

State-building is characterized by being a small footprint effort where the commitment to the receiving state expires when the essential traits of state-building are achieved. Because of this the stability of a state following a state-building effort is arguably short-term as the aid and guidance of a developed state can cease quite quickly. The minimal state apparatus can be a source of dictatorship as a minimal apparatus arguably consists of a few persons that are coordinating the apparatus, thereby putting them in a position of power, especially if it controls a military or police force capable of monopolising violence. If the state apparatus and its national forces are not strong enough to do this, the state could possibly erupt into chaos because of the lack of stabilising powers. Because of all this, state-building can be a short-term effort that possibly creates short-term stability, which distinguishes it to large extent from the earlier nation-building effort during the period when an important goal of American foreign policy goal was to re-build Afghanistan on democratic principles. An authoritarian regime may be stable, but it is often an 'ugly' regime, meaning that the leader/state does not consider the interests of the citizens, but just the state or the authoritarian leader. An authoritarian regime does not necessarily stay stable, because of the narrow support, but if it is able to stay stable it may be a better solution than a failed state in complete chaos. Although that may be the case, the U.S. foreign policy goal of increased civilian support, and building Afghanistan on democratic principles, does not give any consistent and logical arguments for turning to state-building efforts in Afghanistan.

¹²⁰ Suadad and Tim Arango Al-Salhy, "Sunni Militants Drive Iraqi Army out of Mosul," *The New York Times*, June 10, 2014.

American foreign policy goals in Afghanistan for the years 2007-2012 contains some contradictory statements on long-term versus short-term stability, as well as an intended involvement of stabilising efforts in Afghanistan. The Bush Administration's initial intention of making a small imprint in Afghanistan evolved into a nation building effort. Because it was not initially intended to be a nation building effort, it is possible to claim that the initial years of nation building work done by the Bush Administration was a moderate effort, which is observable in the analysis in chapter 2: The aid to Afghanistan for the years 2007-2009 increases moderately and there seems to be no large shift in priority of the different typologies, except for a slightly larger increase in state-building project funding. The goal in 2008 was, according to Boucher, to create long-term stability.

In 2009, when Barack Obama was inaugurated, his administration claimed to narrow the focus of the policy goals in Afghanistan, but in reality they might have expanded it. A narrowing of focus does not necessarily mean to decrease funding; a narrowing, or a focusing of policy may result in more specific goals. Because of that it can be easier to define the tactics of the work that has to be done, thereby increasing knowledge on what to fund in order to reach the goal. When combining this with the plan to withdraw American troops it is a logical consequence that funding will increase in order to fulfil the narrowed policy goals before the American presence in Afghanistan decreased significantly. There was an increased focus on security, which is related to state-building because the ability to enforce law is a vital part of state-building. This correlates with the observations in chapter 2, as from 2010 the funding for state-building projects increases drastically until 2012 (Graph 2, chapter 2). Although there is positive correlation between the increased focus on security and the priority of state-building projects, the state-building projects in the analysis were not directly security in the sense that they contained military purposes. The security aspects of the state-building projects from the analysis were mostly the training of police forces and weapons control, as well as counter-narcotic projects that contributed to reducing criminal groupings that were often connected in some way (often involuntarily) to the insurgents. Although the specific projects analysed are not directly connected to the referenced means of providing security, it is an important aspect of state-building (American military contribution), which is a process and not merely the provision of security. Therefore there is strong correlation between the foreign policy goal of providing security and the increase in funding for state-building projects.

Although there was an increased focus on security after the Obama Administration focused the policy towards Afghanistan, Clinton spoke of a shift from short-term to long-

term stability. This would indicate a shift from a state-building strategy to a nation-building strategy, but the result of the analysis in chapter 2 shows that from 2010 to 2012 the funding of nation-building projects decreased drastically, especially from 2011 to 2012. Hence, Clinton's statement represents a political bias in the sense that her statement seems to have been set in opposition to the Bush Administrations policies, but the fact is that they seemed to work towards the same goal. Boucher stated in 2008 (Bush Administration) that the goal was to return Afghanistan to long-term stability, indicating that a nation-building strategy was already in place. At the same time as funding for nation-building and society-building decreased, the funding of state-building projects increased drastically, especially from 2011 to 2012. This does not correlate with the goal of a shifting focus towards long-term stability, because, as I have argued, nation-building inherently is the strategy that creates the best conditions for long-term stability, where the state in the least extent is recognized by the citizens, and in the greatest extent is based on democratic principles.

The Obama Administrations narrowing of the policy goals thereby resulted in a shift in priority from a nation-building to a state-building strategy, but that was not consistent with their foreign policy goal of creating long-term stability, because of the potential pitfalls of state-building. Nation-building on the other hand (when it works) has a potential to be a far more stable state. There was also a lack of consistency in the Obama Administration's policy goal with regard to the increased focus on security and the deployment of more troops, at the same time as Clinton claimed that they were shifting the focus from short-term to long-term stability. An increased focus on security is not compatible with long-term stability in the sense that security is a state-building trait, and as discussed above, state-building as a strategy does not necessarily create long-term stability. There is of course a necessary predisposition to have some level of security in order to develop a failed state because it makes it possible to work out in the field, but when the major focus is on security and not on development it comes in the way of development and long-term stability, at least for a state built on democratic principles.

The Bush Administration had already established a nation-building strategy according to the stated policy, which is confirmed by the observations being made in chapter 2. Thus, if the Obama Administration wanted to create long-term stability they should have kept evolving the policies of the Bush Administration in order to accomplish their foreign policy goal, not narrow the focus down to security. It is understandable that the Obama Administration saw a need to decrease their military spending in Afghanistan, and their plan to increase troops to break the insurgents' momentum before initiating the withdrawal of

American troops seems like a tactically sound plan, but it is not compatible with the intention of creating long-term stability by building a democratic state. The focus was drawn to a state-building strategy, which does not presuppose democracy, or any recognition of the Afghan citizens whatsoever.

It is important to note that the results of the quantitative analysis is influenced by not including aid for military purposes and the American expenditures for their own troops in the quantitative analysis, because it does not balance out the typology distribution completely. The consequence may be that spending on state-building projects/costs appears to be lower than it actually was, because the quantitative analysis does not include the aforementioned expenditures. At the same time the intention of the analysis is to focus on aid aimed at the civilian Afghan community, and therefore I will argue that the results presented are valid, because at state earlier, the American military commitment is taken into consideration.

As noted in part 3.2, the withdrawal of American troops seem to have influenced the choice of strategy among the three strategies, resulting in a priority of state-building projects in 2012, two years from the transfer of security responsibilities to the Afghan forces. The initial priority of nation-building projects in 2007 was arguably consistent with the Bush Administration's policy goal of returning Afghanistan to long-term stability. Even though the Obama Administration maintained a priority of nation-building projects until 2012, the trend pointed to a shift in priority. This shift in priority was consistent with the stated focus on security, but it was not consistent with Clinton's statement on the shift from short-term to long-term stability, both because of the observations in the quantitative analysis proving a shift from nation-building to state-building, but also because the Bush Administration already had constructed a policy goal of creating long-term stability, and had initiated a nation-building strategy. The conditions in Afghanistan and the success of previous nation-building efforts may have been unsuccessful or misguided, meaning the Obama Administration saw it as reasonable to alter the foreign policy towards Afghanistan. The consequence was an implementation of a state-building strategy, a strategy that potentially creates short-term stability, which in addition is likely to fall apart or turn into an oppressing authoritarian regime after the U.S. withdrew. This stands in opposition to the policy goal of building an Afghan state on democratic values.

3.4 American interests in Afghanistan

American interests in Afghanistan can in many ways be compared with Truman's speech cited in part 1.4: There was a militant minority (Al-Qaeda) threatening the stability in Afghanistan, in addition also threatening the safety of American citizens in the USA. Foreign aid has also proven to be essential for the American ability to influence Afghan development. What is more important in relation to the definition of self-interest is what Truman said of totalitarian regimes: "... totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples ... undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States."¹²¹ This is what I have argued is a link between the Truman Doctrine and realpolitik and I argue that this is also applicable for the case of Afghanistan. The initial intervention in Afghanistan, as discussed earlier, was deeply rooted in the Jacksonian tradition in which one of two major goals of Jacksonianism is to provide security for American citizens. Because Al-Qaeda threatened the security of both international peace, and the security of American citizens, it is closely related to the American use of realpolitik, proven with the example of the Truman Doctrine, because the security issue created an incentive for action. This was a pragmatic decision forced to the surface by the terrorist attack in the USA. The American interest of security for its own citizens did, in the case of Afghanistan, enable an evolvement that exceeded the initial reasoning for intervention, leading to other strategies and goals for both spreading and protecting American interests. Specifically, the American interests evolved from providing security for American citizens to spreading American ideals.

As in the case of the Truman Doctrine, by re-building and assisting Afghan authorities, the U.S. government was able to actively exercise influence on the future development of the Afghan society, both economically and democratically. Referring to Williams, American bilateral relations in most cases are based on promoting American interests, so it is reasonable to assume it is also the case for Afghanistan. In William's book (referenced in part 1.4) it was also possible to establish that his Weltanschauung had some important main points that also can be applied for the case of Afghanistan: "... A penchant for externalizing evil ... [and] [a]n unshakable confidence in American Exceptionalism and American beneficence."¹²² The first point is relatable because the belief that domestic issues are related, or have roots abroad, meant that action was necessary in order to address the issue of security at home. In the case of the terrorist attacks it is not possible to disagree with

¹²¹ Truman, "Recommendation for Assistance," 3.

¹²² Williams, Gardner, and Bacevich, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, 319-20.

this belief, which lead to the intervention in Afghanistan. The second point is relatable because American exceptionalist thought is not necessarily related to expanding American territory, but the spread of American ideals is important because, to some, it provides the base for a better world.

The definition of self-interest in relation to foreign aid has within this thesis been defined as foreign aid allocated for other purposes than pure humanitarian help, in which it fulfils a goal of the political strategy being used. In that context some possible areas of self-interests will be discussed. One that will not be discussed further is American economic interest in Afghanistan because, as stated earlier, the withdrawal of American troops was arguably necessary in order to release funds that could help tackle domestic economic issues, but also because there seems to have been no economic advantages for the U.S. by investing in Afghanistan.

The first American interest is the U.S. government's wish to correct the mistakes of the past, referring to how the U.S. government abandoned Afghanistan after aiding the Mujahedeen in the fight against the Soviet backed government. This was specifically mentioned in one of the Senate hearings cited in part 3.1, and seems to have become an argument for continued American support in Afghanistan, particularly regarding aid for civilians. The question then is, what does the U.S. government gain from this? In essence they could be able to forge a better relationship to both Afghan citizens and the Afghan authorities, but Afghanistan being a state ravaged by war for centuries, it is understandable that this relationship will take time to build, and it is dependent on American aid that is consistent and enables development. On the other hand, the use of the phrase 'to correct the mistakes of the past' may also be a strategic move by the U.S. government to be able to fulfil other American interests by constructing an initial trust between Afghan authorities and the U.S. government. There are particularly two American interests that may be fulfilled by using that strategy: Strategic interests and spreading American ideals.

American self-interest in the strategic positioning of Afghanistan can ultimately be summarized as geographical strategic interests, and the forging of friendly bonds to a state where the population predominantly are Muslims. American co-operation and forging of alliance with a predominantly Muslim state could potentially take the edge of some of the conflicting opinions between Western and Muslim states. It could work as a mitigating element against increasing hostility towards Western values. Building a Muslim state partly on Western ideals and forms of government, in which it actually functions well and enables development, can be a powerful tool, spreading incentive for similar states to perhaps

consider being willing to move in the same direction. Afghanistan's geographic position is an important aspect of the strategic self-interest of the U.S. because it borders to both Iran and Pakistan. Having an allied state in that region could enable an increased degree of American pressure and control of those states via military co-operation with Afghanistan, as well as possibly building American military bases in Afghanistan. The latter does not seem to be within reach for a long time, but in the future, where the Afghan-American relationship possibly has strengthened, it may be an option the Afghan authorities and citizens would be able to support. Both these aspects of strategic interests are connected to two other interests that will be discussed at a later point: Stabilising the region, and forcing a closer co-operation with Pakistan (continuing the fight against extreme Islamism).

The second interest that can be related to correcting the mistakes of the past is as mentioned spreading American ideals, specifically freedom and democracy. As established in part 3.1 on American foreign policy goals in Afghanistan, the development of the Afghan state, by introducing democratic principles, is an important goal of the American aid efforts in Afghanistan. It is not just a foreign policy goal, but it is related to foreign policy traditions through Wilsonianism, and in addition it is also observable in the results of the quantitative analysis, mainly by the extensive funding of nation-building projects. Nation-building projects partly try to establish an Afghan identity, which could create acceptance between the different tribal societies, connecting it to social values. The society-building projects aim to build a pluralistic society based on citizenship in the current Western model. Although the society-building projects were the least prioritized in regard to the total amount of funding, there were definitively most society-building projects. The society-building goal of engaging the civic society could potentially help the mitigation between different communities. This connects nation- and society-building, possibly creating a mutual increase of effect for both strategies. Because the American effort to do both nation-building and society-building are so strong, and because those two ways of developing a society are based on creating democracies through national identities and citizenship, there is a significant connection between the American effort to do nation- and society-building, and American self-interest.

Spreading American ideals is a combination of American Exceptionalism and expansionism. The belief that America is an exceptional state with exceptional ideals that are set to life through the governmental system is in my opinion essential in the wish to spread these ideals. The ability to lead by example and to display that these ideals actually have a function is important for those that wish to spread them, but more so to those that the U.S. government try to spread them to. Expansionism is a critical step in the process of spreading

these ideals abroad. If there was no willingness to spread democracy and freedom, these ideals would only appear in the USA, hence Wilsonianism seems to be an important factor, because it is based on spreading American ideals.

On the other hand, traits of Jacksonianism functions as incentive for the stabilisation of the Central Asia region. The stabilisation of the region is in a large degree connected to strategic interests, because stabilisation of Afghanistan will possibly provide for the physical security of American citizens by preventing a terrorist safe haven. These two aspects intermingle in the sense that the means of stabilisation and strategic interests are potentially attained in the same way; by intervention to remove the old authoritarian regime with ties to a militant minority. This is off course what the U.S. government did in 2001, and by removing the Taliban government and developing the Afghan society towards a democracy, it was in large extent able to stabilise the region, also pushing Al-Qaeda to the brinks, meaning that they disabled the terrorist organisation's ability to plan and execute attacks in the U.S. This strategy has not necessarily worked in the long run, but for the years researched it had a significant effect.

The efforts to dissolve Al-Qaeda lead to several of the organization's leaders to hide in Pakistan, among them i.e. Osama bin Laden. Taliban leaders did the same, resulting in a difficult situation for the U.S. government to dismantle both groups entirely. This brings forward the point on strategic interest's connection with forcing a closer co-operation with Pakistan. In the explanation of U.S. foreign policy goals in Afghanistan, I brought attention to the increasing focus on Pakistan during Senate hearings. The initial intervention in Afghanistan was not to put pressure on Pakistan, but as American policy and policy goals evolved over time according to the realpolitik strategy, there was established an increasing pressure on the Obama Administration to co-operate more with Pakistan. Both Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders were hiding in Pakistan, and the Pakistani authorities were not willing to extradite these persons. It would never have been an option to intervene in Pakistan because, even though it is not a state as developed as Western states, it has a significant degree of sovereignty, and among different vital aspects, it possesses nuclear weapons. The wish for increased co-operation, or perhaps influence on Pakistan, was rooted in the belief that Pakistan was a greater risk for American citizens security than Afghanistan was in the researched years 2010-2012.

The belief that Pakistan, rather than Afghanistan, was more important indicates that, in the U.S. government's opinion, some of its most important interests in Afghanistan were realized, or that the U.S. policy goals had become exhausted and it was time for the U.S.

government move on to the next conflict. On the other hand, it could also be that the U.S. government realized that the Jihadist insurgency was regional, or even global in nature, and therefore the vast amount of expenditure in Afghanistan was no longer logical. That does not mean that the American efforts in Afghanistan are completed, but the security aspect, stabilising the state in such an extent that allows American withdrawal, must have been fulfilled in the view of the Obama Administration. The stabilisation of Afghanistan is also connected to the realization of building the Afghan state on democratic principles, and the ability to provide American citizens with physical security. The correction of past mistakes is still an interest that has not been fulfilled, as that will take many years and a lot of funding, but I will argue that if the U.S. government are willing to turn their aid projects towards nation-building again, it could possibly lead to a long-term stabilisation of Afghanistan with reasonable prospects of further development.

3.5 Reflections on American foreign policy traditions in relation to policy towards Afghanistan and the results of the quantitative analysis

Analysing the relation between foreign policy traditions and the U.S. policy goals in Afghanistan, plus the results of the quantitative analysis, makes it possible to give an opinion on what foreign policy tradition the Bush and Obama Administration followed during the years 2007-2012. The intention is to set the policy goals and the actual implementation of the policy (observations in chapter 2) in an American political context, as this is an interesting measurement of the two administrations' bonds to tradition, which is a strong trait in the American creed. The intention is also to be able to conclude if the American foreign policy goals in Afghanistan follow foreign policy traditions in order to compare it to the observations made in chapter 2, and see if policy is consistent with the execution of aid projects. Another interesting point is whether or not the Bush and Obama Administration seem to follow the same foreign policy tradition.

First of all, as discussed in part 1.8, it is possible to divide the American foreign policy tradition into two periods, the "Old Testament" and the "New Testament," whereby the New Testament approach "... define[s] America as a Crusader State called to bring the

salvation to a world ravaged by revolution and wars.’”¹²³ In relation to the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan this is relatable, but there were other considerations that initially initiated the intervention, first and foremost the security of American citizens, manifested as the war against terrorism. But, when U.S. intervention was implemented it is also possible to draw lines to the Crusader State, because there was also an intention to re-build Afghanistan as a democratic state, thereby being somewhat of a salvation for the Afghan people. As I also argued in part 1.8, American expansionism is related to the New Testament approach and could have influenced American foreign policy significantly. Spreading American democratic values to Afghanistan became a definitive aspect of the intervention, at least to give the Afghan society an opportunity to re-build the Afghan state as a free democratic state, after ridding it of the Taliban regime. The issue with this is that it was not the initially intended policy goal, nor was the implementation of nation-building work something the Bush Administration wanted. It was a consequence of not being able to fulfil the goal of defeating Al-Qaeda and entirely ridding Afghanistan of terrorist organisations. If it could be viewed as part of the New Testament it was incidental and not deliberate.

Mead’s four foreign policy traditions are more applicable than the Old and New Testament approach to this discussion, because his description of their traits are more specific. The attack on the U.S. (9/11) was ascribed to Al-Qaeda whereby the U.S. government demanded Al-Qaeda leaders extradited by the Taliban government in Afghanistan. The Taliban government refused to do this, which led to the attack on Afghanistan. The initial intervention in Afghanistan must be said to follow the Jacksonian tradition as the goal of the intervention was to defeat Al-Qaeda, removing the possibility of more attacks on American citizens at home, thereby providing and enhancing the physical security of the American people, which is an important trait of Jacksonianism. The intervention also led to the dismantling of the Taliban government, which was a link to dismantling all terrorist activity in Afghanistan. Although it should not be achieved by provoking foreign states, the terrorists made the initial attack, and according to Mead, there is no option for governments following the Jacksonian tradition to loose, or to stay passive, when there are American interests to defend. The other major trait of Jacksonianism is the economic well being of Americans, but this trait does not correlate with the policy to intervene and initiate a large scale American military operation in Afghanistan, as this is

¹²³ O’Connor, "American Foreign Policy Traditions," 5.

costly and may deprive the American society of governmental funds, which could potentially be put to good use at home. This aspect will be discussed further at a later point.

After the initial U.S. intervention, it is valid to argue that the policy goals in Afghanistan in some ways evolved along the lines of Wilsonianism, because spreading American democratic and social values became part of the policy goals (at least for the years being researched). On the other hand, the armed conflict was on going during the years 2007-2012 so a continuation of Jacksonianism is arguably also correct. In other words, there are arguments for influence from both the Jacksonian and the Wilsonian tradition during the years researched. Obama's decision to increase troops, in order to break the insurgents momentum, is in my opinion following the Jacksonian tradition as the major point to initiate the intervention was to defeat Al-Qaeda in order to prevent future terrorist attacks, and Obama's decision was a continuation of this goal. On the other hand, The Bush Administration's goal in 2008 was still to defeat the insurgency, and to re-build Afghanistan according to democratic principles. This is twofold in relation to the foreign policy traditions as the first part about defeating the insurgency falls under Jacksonianism, which is also the case for Obama's decision to increase troops, while the part on re-building Afghanistan according to democratic principles is closer to Wilsonianism. The reason being that Wilsonianism is based on a belief that "... the United States has both a moral obligation and an important national interest in spreading American democratic and social values."¹²⁴ This is exactly what Boucher pointed to in 2008, meaning that there are traces of both Jacksonianism and Wilsonianism in the Bush Administration's foreign policy in 2008. Furthermore, Clinton's emphasis on expansion of civilian support in 2011 can arguably be said to fall under the Wilsonian tradition, as civilian support in this context is related to giving the Afghan citizens a stake in their own future, which according to U.S. foreign policy goals, was to build an Afghan state built on democratic principles.

As has been presented, there are traces of both Jacksonian and Wilsonian traits in the U.S. foreign policy goals in Afghanistan, in which the major goal was to provide physical security for American citizens. This goal was the initial reasoning for the intervention, and later continued by the policy goals of preventing a terrorist safe haven. In that sense, the goal of creating an Afghan state, built on democratic principles, must be viewed as a foreign policy tactic and not a goal. If one is to assume it was also a goal to create an Afghan state built on democratic principles, the U.S. foreign policy towards Afghanistan is a blend of the

¹²⁴ Mead, "American Grand Strategy in a World at Risk," 594.

two foreign policy traditions: Initially it is a Jacksonian intervention, but with the justification of spreading peace and democracy (added after the shift towards nation-building work), which falls under Wilsonianism. The stabilising of Afghanistan would contribute to a peaceful international community, but that can also be viewed as a strategy for the goal of providing American citizens with physical security. Therefore, it is arguable that the U.S. foreign policy in largest extent follows the Jacksonian tradition, because of the major goal to provide physical security for American citizens. Considering the intertwining of the foreign policy traditions, and the difficulty to attribute only Jacksonianism or Wilsonianism to U.S. foreign policy goals in Afghanistan, is it an option to propose a difference in the foreign policy strategy in relation to former strategies, such as the Truman Doctrine?

If one is to assume that the American intervention and aid efforts in Afghanistan had both the goal of providing physical security for American citizens, as well as a goal of spreading American democratic and social values, then it is not possible to explicitly attribute just one of the foreign policy traditions discussed to the U.S. foreign policy towards Afghanistan. This can be set in relation to the Truman Doctrine, as the Truman Doctrine must have been said to be the source of armed conflicts where the U.S. was involved, such as the Korean War and the Vietnam War.¹²⁵ Although the Truman Doctrine was the source of U.S. involvement in these armed conflicts, I argue that the content of the Truman's address to the Congress (cited in part 1.4) does open for use of military forces, but that the main focus was on economic aid: "I believe that help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes."¹²⁶ In that sense the Truman Doctrine is essentially based on Wilsonian traits, whereas in worst-case scenarios it is a possibility to lean towards the traits of Jacksonianism in order to protect American values and American citizens. In my opinion this differs from the Bush Doctrine¹²⁷ as the Bush Doctrine valued pre-emptive strikes and actively implemented interventions in order to attain the goal of spreading democracy. Although the Bush Administration's policy evolved towards a nation-building effort in Afghanistan, the intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq were both essentially a consequence of the attack on the U.S. in 2001, where the initial goal was to fight terrorism in order to protect American citizens' safety, as well as providing international security and stability. Therefore, the Bush Doctrine and the Bush

¹²⁵ Lindsay St. Germain, "The Truman Doctrine Vs. The Bush Doctrine: Justifying War with Iraq" (Western Michigan University, 2003), 17.

¹²⁶ Truman, "Recommendation for Assistance," 4.

¹²⁷ The Bush Doctrine was put into writing by Charles Krauthammer (The Washington Post) and consists of four different areas of focus that can be summarised as unilateralism, attacking countries that harbour terrorists, pre-emptive strikes, and an American responsibility to spread democracy.

Administration's actions in Afghanistan were largely based on Jacksonian traits, where the Wilsonian traits followed after a significant military operation. In light of this, I argue that the Bush Doctrine differs from the Truman Doctrine, in the sense that the Bush Doctrine presupposes that the goal of security possibly could be achieved by provoking foreign states, but that the relationship to foreign states should be taken into consideration, because of the goal of providing domestic security for U.S. citizens. This differs from the typical Jacksonian approach, because the Jacksonian approach is to avoid provocation of foreign states until it is not possible to avoid the provocation any more. The Bush Doctrine does not set these limitations because, ultimately, it is the safety of American citizens that is important. The secondary goal of the Bush Doctrine is to provide security for American citizens, by spreading American democratic and social values in order to stabilise the state or region the U.S. government has intervened in, in order to create a more peaceful international society. This presupposes a belief that the Western democratic model is the ideal model for creating stability.

The American foreign policy tradition indicates that among Mead's four traditions, it is reasonable to conclude that the policy towards Afghanistan follows the Jacksonian tradition, but with the possibility of claiming that it also follows some traits of the Wilsonian tradition. The results of the quantitative analysis is also necessary to discuss in relation to foreign policy traditions, because - proven in the discussion on American foreign policy and the connection to nation- and state-building typologies - there is discordance between the policy and the actual aid efforts. The observations made in the quantitative analysis first and foremost indicate a connection to Wilsonianism, because of the nature of nation-building, being the overall most prioritized typology. It focuses on building a stable society and a state that can develop and thrive in the future, focusing on mitigating conflict and providing the citizens a say in national matters. However, state-building gradually became the most prioritized typology, and state-building is more related to Jacksonianism. The being that there is a larger focus on coercion, but also because it seems to be a consequence of the withdrawal of American troops. Withdrawing American troops will, in a small scale, provide safety for those American citizens deployed in Afghanistan, but more importantly because the expenditure on American military efforts in Afghanistan deprives the U.S. government of funds that are needed to create economic well being for American citizens at home. U.S. domestic economic issues does not support continued military spending in Afghanistan. Therefore it is reasonable to argue that the American efforts in Afghanistan have not resulted

in any economic advantages that are significant enough to defend the continued military spending there. It can also be seen as a strategic move.

An interesting observation on this is how it in some ways can be related to the Jeffersonian tradition, as this tradition (according to Mead) focuses on low cost and low level of danger in order to protect American values, by protecting American values in the domestic territory. Mead has, in answers to critique of his definition of Jeffersonianism, pointed out that, what he calls high Jeffersonians, were for containment in accordance with Jeffersonianism, but after World War II saw the need for the U.S. to enter into the role of the central international power as an “unwelcome and dangerous but necessary task.”¹²⁸ This underlines Mead’s definition of how Jeffersonianism focus on a low level of danger in particular, but some international involvement may be necessary in order to keep the international society stable. At the same time the, U.S. government has proclaimed not to repeat the mistakes of the past, and that it will continue aiding Afghanistan in the future, although not as much with security, which is still a transnational effort, and that is more related to Jacksonianism than Jeffersonianism. The results of the quantitative analysis in relation to American foreign policy traditions therefore resemble those of the foreign policy towards Afghanistan.

The conclusion on the relation between American foreign policy traditions and the foreign policy towards Afghanistan for the years 2007-2012, as well as the results of the quantitative analysis, must be that Jacksonianism seems to be the tradition that has the tightest connection to both the foreign policy, and the results of the quantitative analysis, but that there are some aspects of Wilsonianism which seem to influence both those aspects as well. The traces of Wilsonianism may be strategic measures taken in order to fulfil Jacksonian goals, but if the traces of Wilsonianism are also specific goals, they are conflicting with Jacksonianism. This indicates that the Bush Doctrine has potential to shape U.S. foreign policy in the future. It is important to remember that traditions cannot command the same level of influence, and therefore it is not possible to claim that the foreign policy and observations in chapter 2 have equal traces of both Jacksonianism and Wilsonianism.

¹²⁸ Walter Russell Mead, "Do Jeffersonians Exist?," (2010), <http://www.the-american-interest.com/2010/01/08/do-jeffersonians-exist/>.

Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis was to examine the connection between American foreign aid to Afghanistan, American foreign policy traditions, American foreign policy goals in Afghanistan, and U.S. self-interest. The reason for doing this was to analyse the connections between these different aspects of American foreign policy to be able to discuss if there is correlation between foreign policy and aid projects, and to identify which American self-interests have influenced foreign aid in general, using the case of Afghanistan. The thesis is complex because of the many variables, and it was necessary to tie these aspects together to give a complete picture of the foreign policy in which aid strategies have been embedded.

American foreign aid to Afghanistan was a consequence of the intervention in 2001, although the Bush Administration did not initially intend to involve itself in long-term aid work. The small footprint strategy quickly revealed that it was not possible to achieve the wanted results without doing developmental work. Afghanistan proved to be a state and area of several conflicting identities, and after Al-Qaeda and Taliban was driven back to such a degree that it was possible to implement governmental and social reforms, the Bush Administration changed their strategy. The U.S. efforts in Afghanistan entered in a nation-building effort where the goal was to build a new society based on American ideals, specifically democratic principles. The Obama Administration focused their goals in Afghanistan, while continuing the nation-building effort, but as President Obama announced his plan for the withdrawal of American troops, the aid evolved into a state-building effort. The Obama Administration's new focus was mainly to prevent a terrorist safe haven, but in addition it was not to repeat mistakes of the past and leave Afghanistan to cope for itself. Hillary Clinton declared that involving the civilian society was a necessity for the development of a democratic state and to improve the rights of vulnerable groups, such as women.

Although the efforts were made in Afghanistan, Senate hearings revealed an increased focus on Pakistan and bilateral relations with Pakistan. As stated earlier, this does not mean that the purpose of the intervention in Afghanistan was to increase incentive for an expansion of the bilateral relation with Pakistan, but as the U.S. was already involved in Afghanistan, and the reasons for intervening in the first place (dismantling extreme Islamist (terror) organisations) moved into Pakistan, it forced an increasing pressure on the Obama Administration to engage with Pakistani authorities. Thus, American interests area of focus

shifted from Afghanistan to Pakistan, but not necessarily the content of the interests. The shifting focus maintained the interest of American citizens' security because the focus was mainly on a continued dismantling of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

The empirical evidence in chapter 2 (the quantitative analysis) provides some important observations and answers to questions regarding different aspects of the American foreign aid effort in Afghanistan, for the years 2007-2012. First of all, the total distribution of aid displays that the funding for aid in Afghanistan increased significantly from 2007 to 2009, where it stabilised for the remaining years researched. This proves that there was an increased priority of aid-work in Afghanistan. Upon closer observation, the difference in spending for the larger projects also changed, but only in the sense that some projects seemed to have been finished, moving the money to another large project. The project size did not seem to indicate any difference of importance for some of the projects, but rather that some of the projects were more costly to implement. At the same time, the analysis reveals that the smaller the project, the greater the probability was that they were society-building projects. Because of this it is also reasonable, and provable, that there were a significant larger amount of society-building projects than nation- and state-building projects. Finally, the distribution across the typology of aid strategies, noted and discussed in this thesis, revealed that the American aid efforts in Afghanistan were, although unevenly, spread out on the three typologies, confirming H4, the hypothesis that the U.S. aid efforts in Afghanistan were related to state-building, nation-building, and society-building. Although H4 was confirmed, the distribution per typology also revealed a shift in priority, in which nation-building projects had the highest priority until 2011, when state-building projects were most prioritized, and spending on nation- and society-building projects plummeted.

The shift of American interests, and their focus on another area, is visible in the aid during the researched years. The priority of nation-building projects in 2007 through 2011 changed significantly in 2012 where the main priority was state-building projects. With regard to the aspects of the different typologies, this meant a decreased focus on long-term stability and development, moving the aid efforts towards a short-term commitment, as well as possibly creating an environment for short-term stability. One can argue that the shift towards state-building, being a less costly aid effort, could be a consequence of achieving a certain level of stability and development, in which the U.S. government were able to enter into a phase of less aid spending because the Afghan state was able to provide for itself in areas where it had not before. In other words, the U.S. aid efforts had given results that enabled a large short-term state-building effort before scaling down the aid program to a

more moderate size. Although this can be an argument for the shift in priorities of American foreign aid work, it is not necessarily a viable argument. I argue that the state of the development of Afghanistan had at that time, and also today, not reached a level that made it possible for the discontinuation of aid from the international community. Afghanistan is still ranked as one of the least developed states among all states recognized by the United Nations. In order for continued development, and a possibility for a Muslim state to be influenced by Western ideals and values, it is in my opinion imperative that the U.S. aid effort continues, especially considering the necessity to gain the Afghan people and government's trust, considering the past. It will also serve the U.S. government's promise to correct faults of history, which was presented as a foreign policy goal in 2009.

The more convincing argument on why there was a shift in priority towards state-building efforts in 2012, is that because of the withdrawal of American troops was scheduled in December 2014, the Obama Administration saw no other option than rushing the development of the Afghan state, thereby concentrating on areas that fall under state-building criteria, because state-building can be a less time-consuming process than nation-building. Although it can be less time-consuming, the total amount of aid spent per year continued at the same level after the shift towards state-building, but because it is a process that can be completed faster, the spending will quickly decrease after the process is completed. As has been discussed, state-building does not correlate with the Obama Administration's policy to focus on long-term stability, as states developed through state-building can de-stabilise and fall apart, or otherwise evolve into authoritarian regimes. Although authoritarian regimes may be stable over time, the foreign policy goal of the U.S. government evolved into a goal of building Afghanistan on democratic principles, which is not achievable while the regime is authoritarian. The possible outcome is that the progress made may return to the previous state, or at least worsen in some degree. Therefore, the long-term stability of a state built on democratic principles necessarily must be built by using nation-building, possibly in combination with society-building.

At the same time as the major priorities and the shifts in priority are related to nation- and state-building, the confirmed hypothesis is H4, meaning that the American government aid efforts in Afghanistan (2007-2012) were related to state-building, nation-building, and society-building. Thus, the American aid efforts in Afghanistan are not related to only one of the typologies when donating aid, even though there are some differences in priorities. The U.S. aid work in Afghanistan supports itself on several principles, such as: A focus on the civilians rights and abilities to have a say in Afghan state affairs, mitigation between tribal

societies that can possibly end in a shared idea of an Afghan national identity, making the Afghan authorities capable of enforcing laws, and to develop a strong executive government, which is able to create policy that will push Afghanistan towards a more developed and stable state. According to the various aspects of the typologies, this may be a possible way of successfully achieving stability in Afghanistan, as it involves a broad spectrum approach to the development and stabilising of a failed state, including every aspect of the Afghan society, from individual civilians, to different groups in Afghanistan (tribal societies), all the way to the state and government.

American foreign policy, specifically Mead's four traditions, are not all represented in the case of Afghanistan. As discussed in chapter 3, the decision to intervene followed the Jacksonian tradition, while there were traces of Wilsonianism in the following nation-building efforts. The overall trend points toward a combination of these two foreign policy traditions, manifested in the Bush Doctrine, which in my opinion differs somewhat from the Truman Doctrine. It is an interesting idea because the U.S. intervention and aid effort in Afghanistan are so tightly connected, and because there are traces of both Jacksonianism and Wilsonianism. The approach of the Bush Doctrine is not a passive approach to foreign relations, because the most important point is to protect American interests and citizens. In order to do that, it may be necessary to launch a military operation abroad. This has also been done before, and after, the intervention in Afghanistan, but the interesting aspect of the Afghanistan case is that it resulted in a long-term military operation, but more importantly, a long-term aid effort. This can also be seen as connected with the historical American relationship with Afghanistan, as a pronounced foreign policy goal was not to repeat the mistakes of the past. The goal of building Afghanistan anew on democratic principles falls under the Wilsonian tradition, but it is also part of the Jacksonian tradition, because of the aspect of intervention and armed conflict. These traditions cannot control an equal amount of influence, so it may be that the traces of Wilsonianism only serves subordinate of Jacksonianism, but as discussed in chapter 3 they are interconnected in so many ways that the approach of the Bush Doctrine may prove to have formed a new foreign policy strategy, which may be applied in several similar cases in the future. This is especially true when dealing with states such as Afghanistan, meaning failed states outside developed regions built on the current Western state model. It is not necessarily a successful strategy, which can only be concluded with future research, and it is not exactly an approach that stands in opposition to the Truman Doctrine, but the willingness to intervene on the basis of protecting the

security of American citizens before entering into a long-term development aid commitment, is in some ways a new approach.

American self-interest in Afghanistan has been represented in several ways. The strategic location is of vital significance, and so is the spreading of American ideals. The stabilisation of the region could potentially rid the U.S. government of potential terrorist threats, but the threat moved to other states, such as Pakistan, which is possibly related to the realization of the U.S. government that the problem of terrorism is a regional, or even a global, issue. I am not sure if American presence in Central Asia has increased security for American citizens, or other Western states for that matter, but it has brought Al-Qaeda to its knees, and removed their opportunity to use Afghanistan as a safe haven where they were able to train individuals to perform well-planned attacks in the U.S. and other Western states. The U.S. has, so far, also been able to rectify their previous efforts in Afghanistan by keeping their promise of aiding Afghanistan into development in the future. This will take time, and I am not sure if the U.S. government are able to defend the continued level of spending in Afghanistan, particularly when the domestic economy in the U.S. is in such a bad shape. The aspect of economic interests, rather surprisingly, does not seem to have an influence on the American efforts in Afghanistan. It may develop into a state with a thriving economy, and become a potential trade partner for the U.S., but as of now the U.S. has done little else than spend money in Afghanistan.

American foreign policy goals in Afghanistan (2007-2012), and the relation to American foreign policy traditions were at various points conflicting. The shifting focus from security to nation-building, and back to security again, seem to have shaped the aid efforts in Afghanistan. The Bush Administration unwillingly and unintentionally entered into a nation-building effort, whereas the Obama Administration, when taking charge of the foreign policy, eventually shifted focus towards security again. This has been proven in the quantitative analysis, where the empirical evidence portrays an increased focus on state-building efforts in 2012. As I have argued, this can be seen as a consequence of the deteriorating security situation where President Obama increased the military presence in Afghanistan in order to break the insurgents momentum. This was conflicting with Clinton's statement on how the Obama Administration focused on long-term stability because the increased military presence served as a prelude for the retraction of American troops, which arguably could lead to a new period of deteriorating security in Afghanistan. These contradictory policy goals also led to conflicting and contradictory use of Jacksonianism and Wilsonianism. The Jacksonian trait of providing security for American citizens was always a large part of the analysed American

efforts in Afghanistan, but the Wilsonian trait of spreading American values stood out as an important argument for U.S. commitment to Afghanistan. Because of these conflicting interests and policy goals it is understandable that the American aid work shifted from one typology to another.

Although the empirical evidence does not correlate with all of the policy goals and traits of the foreign policy traditions that were present, there is correlation with the process. The increased focus on nation-building in American foreign policy manifested itself in the empirical evidence as a large increase in society- and especially nation-building spending. When President Obama informed (in 2009) that he was sending more troops to Afghanistan, the nation-building spending continued at a high level, but it started to decrease in 2011 and plummeted in 2012, where state-building spending increased significantly. As I have argued the nation- and society-building spending can be viewed as a balancing force against the state-building efforts, in which the military efforts also are part of the equation. Thus, the state-building work became unbalanced towards the end of the years analysed.

The results of this thesis have shown that there are several American interests in Afghanistan, and that they are connected to at least two American foreign policy traditions. No American interests seem to have been of an economic nature during the years that have been researched. Although that seemed to be the case in 2012, the future of American bilateral relations with Afghanistan is uncertain and may evolve into a beneficial relationship for both states, but that must be a suggestion for future research projects. The quantitative analysis confirmed hypothesis H4, meaning that the U.S. foreign aid efforts in Afghanistan relates to state-building, nation-building, and society-building. Although the priority of the different typologies proved to shift, the overall aid effort for the years 2007-2012 combined the traits of the three typologies, which seems to be a reasonable strategy; developing a failed state is a complex process and it is not unreasonable to expect that it is necessary to tackle the different issues from several angles. American foreign policy goals in Afghanistan shifted during the years researched, mostly in accordance with the observed aid effort, but the focus on long-term stability combined with the building of Afghanistan on democratic principles does not correlate with the increased priority of state-building projects in 2012. The difference in priority of the typologies also revealed a difference in the use of American foreign policy traditions. It seems that the Bush Doctrine may have provided a new strategy for American foreign relations, particularly in relation to foreign aid work. Thus, American foreign aid work and foreign policy goals seem to be a conflicted process with ever-changing interests and strategies.

Suggestions for future research

This thesis has provided some empirical evidence, which when set into context of American foreign policy and foreign policy traditions, has revealed some interesting observations that may be relevant for future research. My first suggestion for future research is a replication of the quantitative analysis to see if the results are the same. It may also be possible to review the parameters set for this thesis in order to check the presented results in this thesis.

Furthermore, it is possible to expand the quantitative analysis, as data for other years are published, in order to see if the U.S. continues the level of aid spending in Afghanistan, or if it increases or decreases. An expansion of the quantitative analysis would also enable an observation of the typologies, and whether the priority of them differs, or stay the same.

Finally, it is possible to do a similar quantitative analysis of U.S. involvement in other countries to compare it with the efforts in Afghanistan, or even a comparison of previous efforts in Afghanistan and the commitments this thesis has analysed. This could provide a comparative analysis of aid spending, and the priority of the different typologies, but also a comparison of what foreign policy traditions different presidential administrations has followed.

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Appendix

State-building projects (million USD)

Recipient country	Project title	Total (2007-2012)
Afghanistan	Public Sector Executive Function	1734,70073
Afghanistan	International Narcotics & Law Enforcement: Country Program	1418,6363
Afghanistan	In-Country Counternarcotics Program	706,758
Afghanistan	National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA): Special Overseas Contingency Operations funding authority to support TFBSO Programs	203,25661
Afghanistan	International Narcotics & Law Enforcement: Anti-Crime Programs	177,21613
Afghanistan	Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO): Support Funds	148,04131
Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Rule of Law and Governance	48,85348
Afghanistan	Stabilization Operations and Security Sector Reform - Operational Support	24,58852
Afghanistan	Small Arms Light Weapons	15,7234
Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Rule of Law and Governance	13,1986
Afghanistan	International Narcotics & Law Enforcement: Demand Reduction	11,18624
Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Protective Measures	10,50714
Afghanistan	Conventional Weapons Destruction	4,33333
Afghanistan	Protection and Solutions	4,19137
Afghanistan	Program Support (Narcotics)	3,65178
Afghanistan	US Marshals Service: Operation Enduring Freedom	3,59611
Afghanistan	U.S. Department of State: Nonproliferation Assistance Programs - Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund	3,47332
Afghanistan	Global Threat Reduction (GTR)	3,33891
Afghanistan	Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance	3,30391
Afghanistan	Program Support (Governance)	2,51489
Afghanistan	U.S. Department of State: Nonproliferation Assistance Programs - Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS)	2,21021
Afghanistan	Anti-Corruption Reforms	1,35293
Afghanistan	Technical Assistance for Economic Crimes.	0,8618
Afghanistan	Small Arms and Light Weapons	0,6
Afghanistan	Program Support (Rule of Law)	0,44938
Afghanistan	Special Investigative Unit (SIU) Basic Course	0,29682
Afghanistan	Technical Assistance for Financial Crimes Law Enforcement.	0,2954
Afghanistan	Technical Assistance for Economic Crimes	0,15839
Afghanistan	Federal Bureau of Investigation: Aghan LEEDS	0,12
Afghanistan	Federal Bureau of Investigation: ATI - Crime Scene / Basic Evidence Response Course	0,113
Afghanistan	Department of Justice: Training	0,10452
Afghanistan	International Narcotics & Law Enforcement: Unspecified (Supplemental)	0,06469
Afghanistan	Department of Justice: Assessment	0,05927
Afghanistan	Federal Bureau of Investigation: ATI - LETSS	0,058
Afghanistan	Special Investigative Unit (SIU) Advanced Wireroom Analyst Course	0,04916
Afghanistan	Federal Bureau of Investigation: ATI - Internal Controls / Public Corruption Course	0,04

Afghanistan	Federal Bureau of Investigation: Afghanistan Training Initiative (ATI) - Interview and Interrogation Course	0,035
Afghanistan	Federal Bureau of Investigation: ATI - Kidnapping Investigations Course	0,035
Afghanistan	International Air Cargo Interdiction Training	0,03483
Afghanistan	Border Enforcement Exchange	0,02462
Afghanistan	Federal Bureau of Investigation: ATI - Basic Intelligence Analysis Course	0,0237
Afghanistan	Drug Enforcement Administration: Drug Enforcement Training	0,01885
Afghanistan	Strengthening Local Staff and Community Capacity to Respond to and Prevent Gender Based Violence among Afghan Refugees in Pakistan	0,0157
Afghanistan	International Border Interdiction Training	0,0145
Afghanistan	Program Support (Protection)	0,01195
Afghanistan	Border Management Task Force (BMTF).	0,01132
Afghanistan	Special Investigative Unit (SIU) Advanced Practical Application Course	0,01117
Afghanistan	Federal Bureau of Investigation: ATI - Organized Crime Course	0,00852
Afghanistan	Defense Threat Reduction (DOD)	0,00834
Afghanistan	U.S. Department of State: Nonproliferation Assistance Programs - Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism (WMDT), Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT)	0,00424
Afghanistan	Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives: Firearm Trace	0,00172
Total		4548,16311

Nation-building projects (million USD)

Recipient country	Project title	Total (2007-2012)
Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Transportation	849,09953
Afghanistan	Transport Services	821,66725
Afghanistan	Modern Energy Services	697,45275
Afghanistan	Economic Growth and Development	694,99133
Afghanistan	Conflict Mitigation	493,64397
Afghanistan	Elections and Political Processes	296,05612
Afghanistan	Basic Education	230,38143
Afghanistan	Economic Support Fund	180,05347
Afghanistan	Social Services	171,08116
Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Transportation	167,8201
Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Education	147,41896
Afghanistan	Social Assistance	124,27966
Afghanistan	Peace and Reconciliation Processes	116,22022
Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Other Humanitarian and Reconstruction Projects	108,9412
Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Transportation - FY10 Kandahar City Bridging Solution	101,46634
Afghanistan	Private Sector Productivity	87,88018
Afghanistan	Higher Education	79,52933
Afghanistan	Rehabilitate Afghanistan as a Nation-State	59,84528
Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Education	58,2072

Afghanistan	Inclusive Financial Markets	55,99247
Afghanistan	Justice System	51,82367
Afghanistan	Democracy and Governance	50,49554
Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Water and Sanitation	48,95852
Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Electricity	42,4101
Afghanistan	Water Supply and Sanitation	41,67819
Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Water and Sanitation	33,94713
Afghanistan	Freight Cost of Food Aid under Food For Progress Title I Program	33,87172
Afghanistan	Media Freedom and Freedom of Information	32,28649
Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Electricity	31,50853
Afghanistan	Legislative Function and Processes	31,40164
Afghanistan	Financial Services	29,91966
Afghanistan	Natural Resources and Biodiversity	28,76219
Afghanistan	Commodity Cost of Food Aid under Food For Progress Title I, Commodity Credit Corporation Purchase Program	24,30022
Afghanistan	Constitutions, Laws, and Legal Systems	23,71015
Afghanistan	Workforce Development	22,17508
Afghanistan	Fiscal policy	19,75389
Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Economic, Financial, and Management Improvements	17,56917
Afghanistan	Stability In Key Areas (SIKA)-East - Conflict Mitigation	15,87334
Afghanistan	Program Support (Conflict)	14,14887
Afghanistan	Land Reform in Afghanistan (LARA) Project - Business Enabling Environment	13,96145
Afghanistan	Commodity Cost of Food Aid under Food For Progress Title I Program	13,35803
Afghanistan	Create Conditions for Stability	12,37651
Afghanistan	Capacity Building and Change Management Program	12,20054
Afghanistan	Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation Project (Task Order Five) under the Agency's Water IQC II, Integrated Water and Coastal Resources Management Indefinite Quantity Contract II (i.e., Water IQC II)	10,749
Afghanistan	Support for the American University of Afghanistan	10,39817
Afghanistan	USAID - CONST OF 68 KM SECTION OF SPIN BOLDAK TO BIKAH ROAD	10,18904
Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Transportation - FY10 Route Bear Road/Shah Wali Kot Ford	9,78996
Afghanistan	Engineering, Quality Assurance and Logistical Support (EQUALS) Program - Modern Energy Services	8,39509
Afghanistan	Judicial Independence	8,3338
Afghanistan	Re-establish Food Security	8,25907
Afghanistan	Development Assistance - Development Assistance	8,23051
Afghanistan	Tech. Assist/Training	8,11288
Afghanistan	Freight Cost of Food Aid under Food For Progress Title I, Commodity Credit Corporation Purchase Program	8,07315
Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Transportation - FY10 Spin Boldak Road Phase II & III	7,97463
Afghanistan	Stability In Key Areas (SIKA)-West - Conflict Mitigation	6,75277
Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Irrigation	6,68135
Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Telecommunications	6,66572
Afghanistan	Higher Education Program 3 (HEP-3)	6,07188

Afghanistan	Financial Sector Enabling Environment	5,96859
Afghanistan	Afghanistan Civilian Assistance Program II (ACAP II) - Peace and Reconciliation Processes	5,4383
Afghanistan	Afghanistan Media Development and Empowerment Project (AMDEP) - Media Freedom and Freedom of Information	5,35236
Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Electricity - FY10 Southern Electrical Power System - Starter Kit	5,04049
Afghanistan	Basic Education, Literacy, and Technical-Vocational Education (BELT)	4,68873
Afghanistan	Afghanistan Civilian Assistance Program II (ACAP II) - Conflict Mitigation	4,22679
Afghanistan	Stability In Key Areas (SIKA)-South - Peace and Reconciliation Processes	3,98669
Afghanistan	Community Based Stability Grants (CBSGs) - Peace and Reconciliation Processes	3,81362
Afghanistan	Stability In Key Areas (SIKA)-North - Conflict Mitigation	3,50623
Afghanistan	Strengthening Education in Afghanistan (SEA)	3,38368
Afghanistan	Strengthening Pharmaceutical Systems (SPS)	3,17896
Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Transportation - FY10 Arghistan Bridge Bypass	3,10899
Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Telecommunications	3,0674
Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Transportation - FY11 Lashkar Gah to Nawa Road	2,732
Afghanistan	Program Support (Infrastructure)	2,40543
Afghanistan	Commodity Cost of Food Aid under Food For Education Program	2,02505
Afghanistan	Freight Cost of Food Aid under Food For Education Program	1,84943
Afghanistan	Technical Assistance for OTA Budget and Fiscal Accountability	1,52842
Afghanistan	Technical Assistance for Budget and Financial Accountability	1,40081
Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Transportation - FY10 Tarnak Bridge Bypass	1,08433
Afghanistan	Afghanistan Media Development and Empowerment Project (AMDEP) - Justice System	1
Afghanistan	Technical Assistance for OTA Economic Crimes	0,81201
Afghanistan	Technical Assistance for Financial Institutions Policy and Regulation.	0,76659
Afghanistan	Stability In Key Areas (SIKA)-North - Peace and Reconciliation Processes	0,74329
Afghanistan	Technical Assistance for OTA Revenue Policy and Administration	0,73411
Afghanistan	Building the Capacity of the Ministry to Increase Knowledge of the Labor Code and Basic Worker Rights.	0,65
Afghanistan	Technical Assistance for Budget and Financial Accountability.	0,64046
Afghanistan	Decent Work Country Program - Cooperative Agreement with the International Labor Organization	0,6
Afghanistan	Communications Services	0,5
Afghanistan	Building the Capacity of the Labor Ministry to Increase Knowledge of the Labor Code and Basic Worker Rights.	0,5
Afghanistan	Infrastructure	0,44932
Afghanistan	REHABILITATE AFGHANISTAN AS A NATION-STATE	0,43485
Afghanistan	e-Afghan Ag	0,41506
Afghanistan	Technical Assistance for Revenue Policy and Administration.	0,38226
Afghanistan	Technical Assistance for Tax Policy and Administration	0,37465
Afghanistan	Technical Assistance for Government Debt Issuance and Management.	0,31488
Afghanistan	Technical Assistance for OTA Government Debt Issuance and Management	0,29885
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to People's Radio	0,2851
Afghanistan	Technical Assistance for Banking and Financial Services.	0,24595
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghan Media Resource Center	0,2357

Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Water and Sanitation - FY10 Kanahar City Water Master Plan	0,15341
Afghanistan	Technical Assistance for Operations	0,10478
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to American Abroad Media	0,089
Afghanistan	Faculty Exchange Program	0,07
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to SABA Media Organization	0,06
Afghanistan	Technical Assistance for Financial Institutions Policy And Regulations.	0,05442
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Bureau for Reconstruction and Development	0,0488
Afghanistan	Afghan Ministry of Information and Culture (MoIC) GIS Training	0,04509
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Bureau for Reconstruction and Development for Accountability.	0,042
Afghanistan	Livestock Extension (6)	0,042
Afghanistan	Technical Assistance for OTA Banking and Financial Services	0,03511
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghan Media Resource Center for Freedom of Information.	0,035
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Badghis Social Journalism Association	0,0285
Afghanistan	Technical Assistance for OTA Operations	0,0282
Afghanistan	Technical Assistance for Government Debt Issuance and Management	0,02329
Afghanistan	Rehabilitate Afghanistan as a Nation-State - International Narcotics Control	0,01307
Afghanistan	Education and Water Programs	0,01197
Afghanistan	Training Course	0,0045
Afghanistan	Workshop	0,0045
Afghanistan	Poultry Farm	0,003
Afghanistan	Technical Assistance for Banking and Financial Services	0,002
Afghanistan	Office Of Social Sector Dev. - Education	0,00009
Afghanistan	REESTABLISH FOOD SECURITY	0
Total		6392,26371

Society-building projects (million USD)

Recipient country	Project title	Total (2007-2012)
Afghanistan	Local Government and Decentralization	409,68321
Afghanistan	Agricultural Sector Productivity	350,21656
Afghanistan	Maternal and Child Health	258,83083
Afghanistan	Commodity Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Other Emergency	158,5844
Afghanistan	Crisis Assistance and Recovery	153,43255
Afghanistan	Improved Access to Education and Health Services	134,18813
Afghanistan	Family Planning and Reproductive Health	113,91842
Afghanistan	Interdiction	99,99966
Afghanistan	Agricultural Enabling Environment	74,87198
Afghanistan	Strengthen Microenterprise Productivity	52,95446
Afghanistan	Civic Participation	52,82499
Afghanistan	Ocean Freight of USAID Title II Food Aid for Other Emergency	49,9444

Afghanistan	Partnership Contracts for Health Services (PCH) Program - On Budget	34,09546
Afghanistan	Section 202e Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Section 202e: Section of USAID's P.L. 480 authorizing funds to support Title II activities	31,8852
Afghanistan	of USAID Title II Food Aid for Direct Support Cost	31,5217
Afghanistan	Freight cost of USAID Title II Emergency Food Aid for Other Emergency	25,4575
Afghanistan	Commodity cost of USAID Title II Emergency Food Aid for Other Emergency	24,0652
Afghanistan	Better Education & Healthier Population	22,55783
Afghanistan	ITSH Freight Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Direct Support Cost	21,5199
Afghanistan	ITSH Freight Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Other Emergency	19,8038
Afghanistan	Commodity Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Sri Lank Prepositioning of Food Aid	18,5496
Afghanistan	Inland Freight Co of USAID Title II Food Aid for Other Emergency	17,9732
Afghanistan	Human Rights	17,38337
Afghanistan	of USAID Title II Food Aid for Other Direct Costs	14,2663
Afghanistan	Commodity Value for Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust	14,1227
Afghanistan	Tuberculosis	13,09442
Afghanistan	Partnership Contract for Health Services (PCH) program	11,95759
Afghanistan	Commodity Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Displaced Persons	10,83
Afghanistan	of USAID Title II Food Aid for Other Emergency	10,7179
Afghanistan	Health Services Support Project (HSSP)	10,6701
Afghanistan	Other Public Health Threats	9,30836
Afghanistan	Freight cost of USAID Title II Emergency Food Aid for Direct Support Cost	7,969
Afghanistan	Commodity Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Djibouti Prepositioning of Food Aid	7,8615
Afghanistan	Learning for Community Empowerment Program 2 (LCEP-2)	7,07051
Afghanistan	ITSH Freight Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Other Regular	5,7697
Afghanistan	Inland Freight Co of USAID Title II Food Aid for Health/Nutrition, Direct Distribution - Non HIV	5,3316
Afghanistan	Commodity Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Health/Nutrition, Direct Distribution - Non HIV	4,8528
Afghanistan	Commodity Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for	4,206
Afghanistan	Commodity Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Djibouti Prepositioning	4,05
Afghanistan	Inland Freight Co of USAID Title II Food Aid for Maternal Child Health - Non HIV	3,7633
Afghanistan	Commodity Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Maternal Child Health - Non HIV	3,6156
Afghanistan	ITSH Freight Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for In-Direct Support Cost	3,2991
Afghanistan	Ocean Freight Cost for Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust	3,2739
Afghanistan	ITSH Cost for Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust	3,1806
Afghanistan	Ocean Freight of USAID Title II Food Aid for Sri Lank Prepositioning of Food Aid	3,07
Afghanistan	Ocean Freight of USAID Title II Food Aid for Displaced Persons	3,04
Afghanistan	Implementation of the Small Grants Program for Afghan Womens Civil Society - Local Government and Decentralization	2,98135
Afghanistan	OFDA/Disaster Response	2,74268
Afghanistan	of USAID Title II Food Aid for Other Regular	2,6542
Afghanistan	Afghan Civilian Assistance Program II (ACAP II)	2,58491
Afghanistan	ITSH Freight Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Food For Work	2,3703
Afghanistan	Program Support (Agriculture)	2,27094
Afghanistan	ITSH Freight Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Other Direct Costs	2,2078
Afghanistan	of USAID Title II Food Aid for Sri Lank Prepositioning of Food Aid	2,168
Afghanistan	ITSH Freight Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Indirect Support Cost	1,7373

Afghanistan	Ocean Freight of USAID Title II Food Aid for Maternal Child Health - Non HIV	1,6923
Afghanistan	Freight cost of USAID Title II Emergency Food Aid for In-Direct Support Cost	1,6164
Afghanistan	Section 202e for Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust	1,5802
Afghanistan	ITSH Freight Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Displaced Persons	1,47
Afghanistan	Ocean Freight of USAID Title II Food Aid for	1,403
Afghanistan	Health Field Support	1,4
Afghanistan	Inland Freight Co of USAID Title II Food Aid for Displaced Persons	1,2652
Afghanistan	Ocean Freight of USAID Title II Food Aid for Djibouti Prepositioning of Food Aid	1,2645
Afghanistan	Democracy & Govt.-Broad Citizen Participation	1,24471
Afghanistan	Inland Freight Co of USAID Title II Food Aid for Sri Lank Prepositioning of Food Aid	1,2447
Afghanistan	Ocean Freight of USAID Title II Food Aid for Health/Nutrition, Direct Distribution - Non HIV	1,2348
Afghanistan	Program Support (Private Sector)	1,12968
Afghanistan	Inland Freight Co of USAID Title II Food Aid for	1,1156
Afghanistan	Inland Freight Cost for Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust	1,0381
Afghanistan	HIV/AIDS - Assistance for HIV/AIDS	1
Afghanistan	Freight cost of USAID Title II Emergency Food Aid for Other Direct Costs	0,8879
Afghanistan	Ocean Freight of USAID Title II Food Aid for Djibouti Prepositioning	0,6741
Afghanistan	Assistance for HIV/AIDS	0,66121
Afghanistan	ITSH Freight Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Maternal Child Health - Non HIV	0,635
Afghanistan	Tuberculosis C.A.R.E. - Tuberculosis	0,6
Afghanistan	HIV/AIDS	0,58879
Afghanistan	Child Survival and Health Grants Program (CSHGP)	0,53792
Afghanistan	Program Support (Civil Society)	0,51816
Afghanistan	Program Design and Learning (Agriculture)	0,49372
Afghanistan	Improved social, economic, and/or developmental status of targeted vulnerable populations	0,43541
Afghanistan	Afghan Agricultural Research and Extension Development Program (AGRED) - Agricultural Sector Productivity	0,41818
Afghanistan	Inland Freight Co of USAID Title II Food Aid for Djibouti Prepositioning of Food Aid	0,4114
Afghanistan	Trafficking-in-Persons and Migrant Smuggling	0,385
Afghanistan	ITSH Freight Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Djibouti Prepositioning of Food Aid	0,3544
Afghanistan	of USAID Title II Food Aid for Djibouti Prepositioning of Food Aid	0,307
Afghanistan	ITSH Freight Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Djibouti Prepositioning	0,2503
Afghanistan	Commodity Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Lome Prepositioning of Food Aid	0,2373
Afghanistan	Avian Influenza	0,21938
Afghanistan	Commodity Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Jacinto Prepositioning of Food Aid	0,2121
Afghanistan	Inland Freight Co of USAID Title II Food Aid for Djibouti Prepositioning	0,1504
Afghanistan	Critical needs met of targeted vulnerable groups in emergency situations	0,09891
Afghanistan	Commodity Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Food For Work	0,0883
Afghanistan	Ocean Freight of USAID Title II Food Aid for Jacinto Prepositioning of Food Aid	0,0771
Afghanistan	Inland Freight Co of USAID Title II Food Aid for Food For Work - Non HIV	0,0611
Afghanistan	Commodity Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Food For Work - Non HIV	0,0565
Afghanistan	of USAID Title II Food Aid for Jacinto Prepositioning of Food Aid	0,0468
Afghanistan	Ocean Freight of USAID Title II Food Aid for Lome Prepositioning of Food Aid	0,0407
Afghanistan	OFDA/Disaster Response - Avian Flu	0,0376

Afghanistan	Inland Freight Co of USAID Title II Food Aid for Agriculture/Natural Resource Management, Direct Distribution - Non HIV	0,0291
Afghanistan	Ocean Freight of USAID Title II Food Aid for Food For Work	0,0291
Afghanistan	Ocean Freight of USAID Title II Food Aid for Food For Work - Non HIV	0,0273
Afghanistan	Inland Freight Co of USAID Title II Food Aid for Jacinto Prepositioning of Food Aid	0,0268
Afghanistan	Commodity Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Agriculture/Natural Resource Management, Direct Distribution - Non HIV	0,0235
Afghanistan	Inland Freight Co of USAID Title II Food Aid for Food For Work	0,0231
Afghanistan	Program Support (Disaster Readiness)	0,02131
Afghanistan	of USAID Title II Food Aid for Lome Prepositioning of Food Aid	0,0185
Afghanistan	Inland Freight Co of USAID Title II Food Aid for Lome Prepositioning of Food Aid	0,0106
Afghanistan	Ocean Freight of USAID Title II Food Aid for Agriculture/Natural Resource Management, Direct Distribution - Non HIV	0,0067
Afghanistan	Office of Social Sector Development - HEALTH	0,006
Afghanistan	Nutrition	0
Afghanistan	Addressing Short-Term Stabilization and Long-Term Development Objectives th - Agricultural Enabling Environment	0
Afghanistan	Addressing Short-Term Stabilization and Long-Term Development Objectives th - Agricultural Sector Productivity	0
Afghanistan	Addressing Short-Term Stabilization and Long-Term Development Objectives th - Natural Resources and Biodiversity	0
Afghanistan	Alternative Development and Agriculture	-0,01146
Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Agriculture/Irrigation	63,40709
Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Healthcare	52,46118
Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Repair of Civic and Cultural Facilities	25,43927
Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Civic Support Vehicles	8,95247
Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Food Production and Distribution	3,5421
Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Agriculture	2,50681
Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Agriculture/Irrigation - FY10 Dahla Dam Feasibility Review, Watershed Study	2,12063
Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Civic Cleanup Activities	1,23018
Afghanistan	Humanitarian Mine Action	83,84625
Afghanistan	Initial Contribution to ICRC for its 2009 South Asia Emergency Appeal	41,846
Afghanistan	Emergency Refugee Assistance: Third Contribution to budget extension appeal for Afghanistan, including new and additional requirements for ICRC	7,9
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Center for International Private Enterprise	5,58108
Afghanistan	Refugee Assistance Activities	4,02543
Afghanistan	Integrated Support to GOA	2,1638
Afghanistan	Victims Assistance	2
Afghanistan	Health and Social Resettlement Support to Returnees, Refugees, and Return affected Communities in Eastern Afghanistan.	1,78768
Afghanistan	Sustainable Livelihood and Reintegration Program in Takhar Province	1,7876
Afghanistan	Recovery and Emergency Support Toward Afghan Returnee Transitions (RE-START) an integrated approach.	1,7
Afghanistan	Supporting sustainable return to Kabul province	1,59894
Afghanistan	Supporting Sustainable Return To Kabul Province	1,59416
Afghanistan	Supporting Sustainable Return to Kabul Province	1,551
Afghanistan	Nangarhar And Laghman Health Program	1,4967

Afghanistan	Nangarhar and Laghman Health Program	1,46656
Afghanistan	Prevention of and response to vulnerability amongst returnee in IDP women and girls in Afghanistan	1,426
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Center for International Private Enterprise for Democratic Ideas and Values.	1,37165
Afghanistan	Creating Sustainable Livelihood Opportunities for Returnees in Northern Afghanistan	1,2
Afghanistan	Sustainable Family Improvement Project	1,10396
Afghanistan	Integrated Shelter Assistance	1,06
Afghanistan	Mobile Demining Program	1,03333
Afghanistan	Integrated Return to Kabul	1,027
Afghanistan	Supporting Durable Return and Recovery in Paktya Province	1,02237
Afghanistan	Assistance for Refugee Reintegration in Afghanistan - Paktya	1
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Welfare Association for Development of Afghanistan	0,987
Afghanistan	Creating Sustainable livelihood opportunities for urban and sem-urban returnees communities in N. Afghanistan	0,922
Afghanistan	Supporting Livelihood Security for Returnee Communities in Northern Afghanistan	0,898
Afghanistan	Kandahar, Kawzjan & Faryab Integrated And Sustainable Services For Returnees And Host Communities	0,88789
Afghanistan	Health & Social Resettlement Support in Eastern Afghanistan	0,88582
Afghanistan	Refugee Reintegration Project	0,86989
Afghanistan	Kandahar Returnee Reintegration Program (KRRP)	0,86107
Afghanistan	Anti-Trafficking in Persons Project [through International Organisation for Migration]	0,8475
Afghanistan	Kandahar, Jawzjan and Faryab Integrated and sustainable services for returnees	0,83544
Afghanistan	Reintegration support to improve health, livelihoods, and prevention of Gender Based Violence for refugee - returnees to E. Afghanistan	0,83173
Afghanistan	Afghan Refugees and Returnees in Baghlan & Kunduz Takkar Provinces	0,80713
Afghanistan	Supporting Sustainable Return in Khaki Jabbar District	0,8
Afghanistan	NGO Project for Afghan Refugees and Returnees in Baglan, Kunduz, Takhar Provinces in Afghanistan	0,78401
Afghanistan	Sustainable Family Improvement Project Basic Education, Health Promotion, and Leadership Development for Women	0,74189
Afghanistan	Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Program - Unspecified Project	0,73878
Afghanistan	Conservation of Qala Ikhtyaruddin, the 15th-century Citadel of Herat	0,725
Afghanistan	ASLI: Afghanistan Sustainable Livelihoods Initiative for Returned Refugees	0,71812
Afghanistan	Cottage Industry Cooperatives(CICs) for Returnees in Kunar and Nangahar: Building Value Chains from Households to Marketplace	0,70494
Afghanistan	Anti-Trafficking [through Hagar USA Inc.]	0,704
Afghanistan	Sustainable family improvement Project Basic Education Health Promotion and Life Skill Training and Business Development for Women	0,69274
Afghanistan	Developing Sustainable Livelihood Opportunities for Refugee Returnee and other socially-excluded Women in Afghanistan through Commercial Integrated Farming Initiatives in Parwan Nangarhar Provinces.	0,68331
Afghanistan	Assistance for Refugee Reintegration in Afghanistan (ARRA)	0,66694
Afghanistan	Afghanistan's Neglected Boys: A Model of Care for Male Trafficking Victims	0,65
Afghanistan	Transitional Support To Improve Health Status And Ensure The Continuum Of Care For Refugees, Returnees And Other Persons Of Concern In Eastern Afghanistan	0,63465
Afghanistan	Jawzjan and Kandahar Integrated and Sustainable Services for Returnees and Host Communities Project	0,62554
Afghanistan	Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Program - Elections: Increasing Meaningful Participation of Women and Youth in Parliamentary and District Councils Elections	0,591

Afghanistan	Empowering Refugee Returnee And Other Socially-Excluded Women In Afghanistan Thorough Sustainable Agribusiness Opportunities And Reights-Based Activities In Parwan, Nahgarhar & Heart Provinces	0,54185
Afghanistan	Hamsaya Project: Supporting Sustainable Refugee Return - Afghanistan	0,49133
Afghanistan	Prevention of and response to vulnerability amongst returnee and IDP women and girls in Afghanistan	0,49113
Afghanistan	Assistance for Refugee Reintegration in Afghanistan	0,48908
Afghanistan	Healthcare and Repatriation Support for Afghan Refugees	0,48818
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Cooperation Center for Afghanistan	0,4607
Afghanistan	TRANSITIONAL SUPPORT TO IMPROVE HEALTH STATUS AND ENSURE THE CONTINUUM OF CARE FOR REFUGEES, RETURNEES AND OTHER PERSONS OF CONCERN IN EASTERN AFGHANISTAN	0,45569
Afghanistan	Conservation of Qala Ikhtyaruddin, the 15th-Century Citadel of Herat, Phase II	0,45
Afghanistan	Sustainable Livelihoods	0,44535
Afghanistan	Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Program - Media: Islamic Rights Education	0,442
Afghanistan	Prevention Of Gender-Based Violence And Integrated Social Support For Refugees, Returnees, And Other Persons Of Concern In Eastern Afghanistan	0,43572
Afghanistan	Creating Sustainable livelihood opportunities for urban and semi-urban returnees communities in N. Afghanistan	0,426
Afghanistan	Reintegration Program	0,42312
Afghanistan	Agricultural Productivity Enhancement for Afghan Refugees (APEAR)	0,42007
Afghanistan	Consolidated Support for Afghan Returnees & Internally Displaced Persons in Logar Province	0,39844
Afghanistan	Consolidated Support for Afghan Returnees & Internally Displaced Persons in Ghazni Province	0,3786
Afghanistan	Humanitraian Mine Clearance	0,36868
Afghanistan	Sustainable livelihoods development for returnees/Afghanistan	0,366
Afghanistan	Support for Repatriating Refugees in 5 Shamoli Districts	0,35326
Afghanistan	Transitional Support To Ensure The Continuum Of Care And Protect The Health Status Of Refugees Returnees And Other Persons Of Concern In Eastern Afghanistan	0,34779
Afghanistan	Developing Sustainable Livelihood Opportunities - for IDPs in Pawran Province - Afghanistan	0,34092
Afghanistan	GBV Prevention Support Afghanistan	0,33877
Afghanistan	Nangarhar Health Program	0,33149
Afghanistan	Gender Based Violence Prevention South Asia - Afghanistan	0,32658
Afghanistan	Sustainable Livelihoods Development for Returnees/Afghanistan	0,303
Afghanistan	Integrated Return	0,29839
Afghanistan	Anti-Trafficking in Persons Project [through Voice of Afghan Women in Global Media]	0,296
Afghanistan	Refugee Assistance	0,27816
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Hasht-e Subh Daily	0,2746
Afghanistan	Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Program - Civil Society: Tolerance Caravan	0,27
Afghanistan	Integrated Community-Based Livelihoods, Shelter, And Legal Assistance To Returnees, Internally Displaced Persons And Vulnerable Families, Including Vulnerable Women In Afghanistan	0,26943
Afghanistan	Shelter Project for Displaced Afghans	0,2619
Afghanistan	Kandahar And Jawzjan Integrated And Sustainable Services For Returnees And Host Communities	0,25459
Afghanistan	Anti-Trafficking [through Voice of Afghan Women]	0,25
Afghanistan	Anti-Trafficking [through Afghan Women Skills Development Center]	0,25
Afghanistan	Prevention of and Response to Gender Based Violence to Returnees and Return Affected Communities in Eastern Afghanistan	0,24626
Afghanistan	Health & Social Resettlement Support to Returnees - Afghanistan	0,24519
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghanistan National Participation Association	0,245

Afghanistan	Sustainable Family Improvement Project Basic Education, Health Promotion, And Leadership Development For Women	0,24339
Afghanistan	Reintegration Support to Improve Health, Livelihoods, and Prevention of Gender Based Violence for Refugee-Returnees in Eastern Afghanistan	0,24338
Afghanistan	Kandahar, Kawzjan & Faryab Integrated and Sustainable Services for Returnees and Host Communities	0,23525
Afghanistan	Transition Support Programming for Afghan Refugees in Baluchistan and Haripur	0,23173
Afghanistan	Reintegration Support to Returnees families and IDPs - Afghanistan	0,22706
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghan Institute of Learning	0,22
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghanistan Human Rights Organization	0,2169
Afghanistan	Assistance for Refugee Repatriation in Afghanistan	0,21092
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Women Activities and Social Services Association	0,2108
Afghanistan	Reintegration Support to Returnee families & IDP - Afghanistan	0,20619
Afghanistan	Supporting Sustainable Return And Reintegration For Afghan Refugees In Urban Areas	0,20265
Afghanistan	GBV Prevention Support - Afghanistan	0,20185
Afghanistan	Prevention of Gender-based Violence and Integrated Social Support for Refugees, Returnees, and Other Persons of Concern in Eastern Afghanistan	0,20155
Afghanistan	Anti-Trafficking [through International Organization for Migration]	0,2
Afghanistan	Anti-Trafficking in Persons Project [through Afghan Women Skills Development Center]	0,2
Afghanistan	GBV Prevention/Support - Afghanistan	0,19814
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Oruj Learning Center (Afghanistan) for Civic Education.	0,195
Afghanistan	Primary Health Care Program for Afghan Refugees	0,18053
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Hasht-e Subh Daily for Freedom of Information.	0,18
Afghanistan	Health and Social Resettlement Support to Returnees - Afghanistan	0,17549
Afghanistan	Support And Prevention Of Gbv For Refugees - Eastern Afghanistan	0,15707
Afghanistan	Nangarhar Health Program - Afghanistan	0,15402
Afghanistan	Reintegration Support to IDP's	0,15097
Afghanistan	Sustainable Livelihood Opportunities	0,14858
Afghanistan	Sustainable Family Development Project	0,14808
Afghanistan	Integrated Afghan Refugee Assistance Program	0,145
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Khorasan Legal Services Organization	0,1437
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Oruj Learning Center (Afghanistan)	0,1319
Afghanistan	Supporting Sustainable Return, Reintegration And Increased Infrastructure, Opportunities And Skills For Returnees In Kabul Province	0,13087
Afghanistan	Health & Social Resettlement Support to Returnees - Afghanistan	0,12932
Afghanistan	Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Program - Elections/Civic Participation: Women and Youth VOTES	0,127
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Wakht News Agency	0,1269
Afghanistan	Developing Sustainable Livelihood Opportunities - Afghanistan	0,1267
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghanistan Youth National and Social Organization	0,124
Afghanistan	Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Program - Elections/Civic Participation: Cell Phone Voter Project: Enhancing Civic Education during the Afghan Elections	0,12
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Legal and Cultural Services for Afghan Women and Children	0,1193
Afghanistan	Reintegration Support to IDPs	0,11835
Afghanistan	Reintegration support to Returnees families & IDPs - Afghanistan	0,11473
Afghanistan	Reintegration Support to IDPS	0,11034

Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghanistan National Participation Association for Democratic Ideas and Values.	0,109
Afghanistan	Reintegration support to improve health, livelihoods, and prevention of Gender Based Violence for refugee - returnees to E. Afghanistan	0,10662
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Social Services for Afghan Women Organization	0,1059
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghanistan Study Center	0,104
Afghanistan	Preservation and Protection of the Ruins of the 9th-Century Mosque of Noh Gonbad	0,1
Afghanistan	Integrated Assistance to Young Women Return	0,09964
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghan NGO Coordination Bureau	0,098
Afghanistan	EMPOWERING REFUGEE RETURNEE AND OTHER SOCIALLY-EXCLUDED WOMEN IN AFGHANISTAN THORUGH SUSTAINABLE AGRIBUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES AND REIGHTS-BASED ACTIVITIES IN PARWAN, NAHGARHAR & HEART PROVINCES	0,09602
Afghanistan	Hamsaya Project: Supporting Sustainable Refugees Return	0,096
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Cooperation Center for Afghanistan for NGO Strengthening.	0,095
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Health and Development Center for Afghan Women	0,0938
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghan Women's Network	0,09095
Afghanistan	Sustainable Family Improvement Project - Afghanistan	0,0884
Afghanistan	Healthcare Gender Based Violence and Repatriation Support for Afghan Refugees	0,08656
Afghanistan	Health Project for Returnees	0,08643
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghan Women's Resource Center	0,0851
Afghanistan	Sustainable Livelihood Opportunities	0,085
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghanistan Women Support Association	0,0846
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Hasht-e Subh Daily (Afghanistan)	0,0846
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to National Maliks Association	0,0842
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Modern Organization for Development of Education	0,0828
Afghanistan	Restoration of the 19th-century Goldasta Mosque in Kabul	0,0827
Afghanistan	Primary Healthcare and Repatriation Support for Afghan Refugees in Northwest Frontier Province Pakistan	0,08052
Afghanistan	Nangahar Health Program	0,0803
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Institute for War and Peace Reporting	0,08
Afghanistan	Improving the lives of Afghan Female Returnees in Kabul Province, Afghanistan	0,07971
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Khorasan Legal Services Organization for Rule of Law.	0,0785
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Institute for War and Peace Reporting for Freedom of Information.	0,076
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghanistan Human Rights Organization for Rule of Law.	0,075
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Cooperation for Peace and Unity	0,075
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Western Afghan Women's Network	0,0746
Afghanistan	GBV Prevention South Asia - Afghanistan	0,07342
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Wakht News Agency for Freedom of Information.	0,07
Afghanistan	Shelter for vulnerable refugees	0,06984
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Youth Educational Services	0,0654
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghan Education Productions Organization for Democratic Ideas and Values.	0,0653
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghanistan Youth National and Social Organization for Accountability.	0,0635

Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Women and Youths for Peace and Development Organization	0,0627
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Educational and Training Centre for Poor Women and Girls in Afghanistan for Rule of Law.	0,062
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Women Association for Relief and Development Actions (WARDA) for Civic Education.	0,062
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Educational and Training Centre for Poor Women and Girls in Afghanistan	0,0613
Afghanistan	Reduced Vulnerability Of Returnees	0,0612
Afghanistan	Gender Based Violence Prevention Support Afghanistan	0,06112
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Legal and Cultural Services for Afghan Women and Children for Rule of Law.	0,0605
Afghanistan	Community based primary and reproductive health services for Afghan refugees and host communities in Baluchistan, Pakistan	0,06
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Marefat Civil Capacity Building Organization	0,06
Afghanistan	Sustainable Family Improvement Project Afghanistan	0,05968
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Modern Organization for Development of Education for Civic Education.	0,0594
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Women Activities and Social Services Association for Civic Education.	0,058
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghans for Civil Society	0,055
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Kabul Pressistan	0,055
Afghanistan	Sustainable Family Improvement Project/Afghan	0,05493
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Social Services for Afghan Women Organization for Human Rights.	0,0537
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Center for Policy Priorities (CFPP)	0,053
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Educational & Training Centre for Poor Women and Girls in Afghanistan	0,0509
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Women Association for Relief and Development Actions (WARDA)	0,0507
Afghanistan	Conservation of Khoja Rokhband Cistern Complex in Herat	0,05
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Justice for All Organization for Rule of Law.	0,05
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Welfare Association for Development of Afghanistan for Strengthening Political Institutions.	0,05
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Legal and Cultural Services for Afghan Women and Children (LCSAWC)	0,0496
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Cooperation for Peace and Unity (Afghanistan)	0,047
Afghanistan	Emergency Refugee Assistance: Prevention Of Gender-Based Violence And Integrated Social Support For Refugees, Returnees, And Other Persons Of Concern In Eastern Afghanistan	0,04669
Afghanistan	Health Care Project for Afghan Refugees	0,04657
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghan Women's Resource Center for Civic Education.	0,0465
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Development Organization for New Afghanistan	0,0455
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Social Services for Afghan Women Organization (SSAWO)	0,0451
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Vital Voices Global Partnership	0,04507
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Educational and Training Center for Poor Women and Girls of Afghanistan (ECW)	0,045
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Justice for All Organization	0,045
Afghanistan	Consolidated Support for Afghan Returnees & IDPs in Ghazni Province	0,0439
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Modern Organization for Development of Education	0,043

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Afghanistan	Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Program - Forensic Assistance (Human Rights): Securing Afghanistan's Past	0,04252
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghan Women's Resource Center (AWRC)	0,04
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghanistan Women Services and Education Organization	0,04
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghans for Progressive Thinking	0,04
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Khadija Kubra Women Association for Culture	0,04
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to PACT Communications	0,04
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Women and Youths for Peace and Development Organization (Afghanistan)	0,04
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Youth Educational Services for Civic Education.	0,04
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Training Human Rights Association for Afghan Women	0,0395
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Development Organization for New Afghanistan (DONA) for Civic Education.	0,0384
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Training Human Rights Association for Afghan Women (THRA)	0,037
Afghanistan	Nangahar Health Project	0,03673
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghan Women Services and Education Organization (AWSE)	0,03645
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Western Afghan Women's Network for Rule of Law.	0,036
Afghanistan	Health Project for Afghan Refugees	0,03577
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Faanoos Magazine	0,0356
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Youth Educational Services (Afghanistan)	0,0351
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghanistan Development Foundation (ADF)	0,0333
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Herat Professionals Shura	0,0325
Afghanistan	Reintegration Support to Internally Displaced Persons	0,03249
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Equality Social and Cultural Organization	0,0319
Afghanistan	Transition Support Programming for Afghan Refugees	0,0301
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Worker Women Social Organization	0,0258
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Youth Educational Services (YES)	0,0255
Afghanistan	Developing Sustainable Livelihood Opportunities - Afghanistan	0,02513
Afghanistan	Ambassador's Fund Activity - Funding for Embassy Kabul to fund HOLD	0,02497
Afghanistan	Job Training and Placements for Refugee returnee women in Herat	0,0249
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghanistan Organization Women Arise	0,024
Afghanistan	National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghanistan Organization Women Arise for Civic Education.	0,0204
Afghanistan	Ambassador's Fund Activity - Julia Taft fund for school project	0,02
Afghanistan	Ambassador's Fund Activity - Julia Taft Fund for textile training production	0,01998
Afghanistan	Nangarhar And Laghman Health Project	0,0199
Afghanistan	Developing sustainable livelihood opportunities - Afghanistan	0,01856
Afghanistan	Nangarhar Health Program (Afghanistan)	0,00998
Afghanistan	Consolidated Support for Afghan Returnees & IDPs in Logar Province	0,00928
Afghanistan	Women's Education Economic Opportunity Program	0,00583
Afghanistan	Integrated return	0,00521
Afghanistan	Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Program - Human Rights / Rule of Law: Increasing Women's Rights and Access to Justice	0,00473

Afghanistan	Integrated return central region	0,00462
Afghanistan	Developing Sustainable Livelihood Opportunities - for Internally Displaced Persons in Pawran Province - Afghanistan	0,00357
Afghanistan	Shelter Community Infrastructure - Afghans	0,00264
Afghanistan	Hamsaya Project	0,00202
Afghanistan	Reintegration Support to Families- Afghanistan	0,00199
Afghanistan	Kabul National Museum Support	0,00064
Afghanistan	Operational Capacity for Afgan Returns	0,00058
Afghanistan	Nicra Adj. for BEFARE Afghan Refugee Camp School Ops in NWFP	0,00033
Afghanistan	Reproductive Healthcare among Afghan Refugees	0,00009
Afghanistan	Health Assistance	0,00006
Afghanistan	Assistance for Afghan Refugees	0,00002
Afghanistan	Reintegration of Displaced Afghans	0,00001
Afghanistan	Capacity-Building for the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation of Afghanistan	0
Afghanistan	Close-out Adjustment - Community-Based Participation Program in Afghanistan on Elimination of Gender-Based Violence and Promoting Participation of Women and Girls in Decision Making and Income Generation	0
Afghanistan	Contribution To International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)'s 2012 Emergency Appeal For Afghanistan	0
Afghanistan	Empowering Refugee Returnee and other socially-excluded women in Afghanistan through sustainable agribusiness opportunities and Rights-based activities in Parwan, Nahgarhar & Herat Provinces	0
Afghanistan	Supporting Sustainable Return And Reintegration For Afghan Refugees In Urban Areas	0
Afghanistan	Emergency Refugee Assistance: Prevention of Gender-based Violence and Integrated Social Support for Refugees, Returnees, and Other Persons of Concern in Eastern Afghanistan	0
Afghanistan	Support And Prevention Of Gender-Based Violence For Refugees, Returnees And Other Persons Of Concern In Eastern Afghanistan	0
Afghanistan	Transitional Support To Ensure The Continuum Of Care And Protect The Health Status Of Refugees, Returnees And Other Persons Of Concern In Eastern Afghanistan	0
Afghanistan	Transitional Support to Improve Health Status and Ensure the Continuum of Care for Refugee, Returnees and other persons of concern in Eastern Afghanistan	0
Afghanistan	Close-out of FY07 Agreement for Afghan reintegration support to returnee families and Internally Displaced Persons	0
Afghanistan	Strengthening Resilience Of Returnees, Afghanistan: Improved Access To Wash Facilities And Provision Of Economic Opportunities To The Returnees In 04 Districts Of Nangarhar Province- Afghanistan.	0
Afghanistan	Prevention Of And Response To Gender Based Violence To Returnees And Return Affected Communities In Eastern Afghanistan	-0,01108
Afghanistan	Reintegration Support To Improve Health, Livelihoods, And Prevention Of Gender Based Violence For Refugee - Returnees To E. Afghanistan	-0,01141
Afghanistan	Agricultural Productivity Enhancement For Afghan Refugees (Apear)	-0,0176
Afghanistan	OS-OGHA: Afghanistan Health Initiative	17,594
Afghanistan	Polio Eradication. Oral Polio Vaccine purchase through UNICEF.	5,9035
Afghanistan	Polio Eradication. Technical assistance grants to UNICEF.	4,49178
Afghanistan	CDC: Reduce Maternal and Child Health M&M	2,48131
Afghanistan	Polio Eradication through the World Health Organization.	1,80749
Afghanistan	CDC: FELTP	1,05488
Afghanistan	President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief - F Operational Plan Programs	0,36815
Afghanistan	Global Measles Immunization Initiatives through the World Health Organization.	0,35894
Afghanistan	CDC: Influenza	0,12077

Afghanistan	CDC: Surveillance & Capacity Building Activites	0,12077
Afghanistan	President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief - Country Programs	0,11731
Afghanistan	CDC Mine Action Related Country Activities	0,1
Afghanistan	SAMHSA: Establishing a model of behavioral health services for rural and underserved areas	0,051
Afghanistan	OS-OGHA: OS-OGHA: Afghanistan Health Initiative	0,02716
Afghanistan	CDC: OTHER GLOBAL HEALTH (POST HELD)	0,00055
Afghanistan	CDC: GLOBAL HEALTH FEDERAL REIMBURSABLE ACTIVITY (POST)	0,00001
Afghanistan	CDC: Global Measles Immunization Initiatives through the World Health Organization.	0
Afghanistan	CDC: Polio Eradication through the World Health Organization.	0
Afghanistan	CDC: Technical assistance sustainability and capacity building.	0
Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Agriculture/Irrigation	74,7302
Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Healthcare	21,31886
Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Repair of Civic and Cultural Facilities	10,14923
Afghanistan	Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Food Production and Distribution	2,30824
Afghanistan	President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief - F Operational Plan Programs	0,01
Afghanistan	Afghanistan Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock's Capacity-Building and Change-Management Program; Trilateral Working Groups	86,3
Afghanistan	Total Cost of Food Aid under Food For Progress Title I, Commodity Credit Corporation Purchase Program	20,54625
Afghanistan	Reconstruction and Stabilization Agricultural Advisors in Afghanistan	15,35
Afghanistan	Agricultural Developmnet for Afghansitan Pre-deployment Training (ADAPT)	1,14012
Afghanistan	Agricultural Data Collection and Utilization System	0,29706
Afghanistan	Reduced Interest: Agriculture - PL-480	0,24474
Total		3034,51859